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ABSTRACT 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON SHAREHOLDER BASE, FIRM BEHAVIOR,  
AND FIRM VALUE 
 
Yi Jian 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Kenneth Yung 
Most companies spend significant time and attention to managing their shareholder base 
out of the belief that significant stock market benefits can be reaped if they can identify and attract 
the right shareholders. Consistent with the opinion of practitioners, many financial economists 
suggest that the shareholder base is an important determinant of firm value and corporate policies 
(Lins and Warnock 2004; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaley 2005; Bodnaruk and Ostberg 
2013). Despite the importance of the shareholder base, research on the topic has been scant. What’s 
more, previous studies have reported conflicting results regarding the effect of the shareholder 
base on firm behavior and firm value. Thus, I want to add to the literature by exploring the effects 
of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in a foreign setting. 
This dissertation explores the effect of shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value 
in China.  It seeks to answer the following research questions: 1) what is the effect of shareholder 
base on risk-taking and dividend payout? 2) What is the impact of shareholder base on earnings 
management? And 3) what is the direct effect of shareholder base on firm value? 
Essay 1 examines the effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value. 
Contrary to popular belief, the results show that a large shareholder base does not benefit firms in 
China, suggesting that a large shareholder base in China implies elevated agency conflicts between 
insiders and outsiders. We find that a larger shareholder base is associated with lower levels of 
capital expenditures, a lower standard deviation of return on assets, a lower standard deviation of 
   
 
return on equity, and higher dividend payouts in China. Researchers have concluded that high 
dividend payouts in China are expropriations by insiders. Our results therefore imply that insiders 
increase the expropriation of outsiders by diverting resources for private motives as the conflict 
between the two parties escalates. Our finding of a negative impact of the shareholder base on firm 
value in China further suggests that investors are concerned about the motives of insiders as agency 
conflicts intensify. Consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982), our results imply that the 
shareholder base in China serves as a proxy for the agency conflict between insiders and outsiders 
of firms.  
Essay 2 focuses on the effect of shareholder base on earnings management. Consistent with 
popular belief, we find that a larger shareholder base provides a monitoring effect on earnings 
management in China. However, investors in China are still relatively inexperienced and fail to 
see the link between earnings management and tunneling. Specifically, we find a negative relation 
between discretionary accruals and the shareholder base. In addition, we find some weak evidence 
that the shareholder base provides a controlling effect on real activities manipulation. Our results 
also show a positive relation between the shareholder base and tunneling activities in China. The 
rapid rise of the shareholder base in China provides insiders with more opportunities to extract 
private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
Both essays suggest that improvements to the legal system and corporate governance are 
important before an expanding shareholder base can have positive effects on firm behavior and 
firm value for countries that have a poor record of investor protection and where firms are heavily 
controlled by the state. This dissertation adds to the scant literature on the shareholder base by 
examining the effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in China. Given that 
   
 
China is in the process of developing its capital markets, the findings on the shareholder base of 
firms in China may have significant policy implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most companies spend significant time and attention to managing their shareholder base 
out of the belief that significant stock market benefits can be reaped if they can identify and attract 
the right shareholders. Consistent with the opinion of practitioners, many financial economists 
suggest that the shareholder base is an important determinant of firm value and corporate policies 
(Lins and Warnock 2004; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaley 2005; Bodnaruk and Ostberg 
2013). Despite the importance of the shareholder base, research on the topic has been scant. What’s 
more, previous studies have reported conflicting results regarding the effect of the shareholder 
base on firm behavior and firm value. Thus, I want to add to the literature by exploring the effects 
of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in a foreign setting. 
This dissertation explores the effect of shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value 
in China.  It seeks to answer the following research questions: 1) what is the effect of shareholder 
base on risk-taking and dividend payout? 2) What is the impact of shareholder base on earnings 
management? And 3) what is the direct effect of shareholder base on firm value? 
Essay 1 examines the effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value. 
Contrary to popular belief, the results show that a large shareholder base does not benefit firms in 
China, suggesting that a large shareholder base in China implies elevated agency conflicts between 
insiders and outsiders. We find that a larger shareholder base is associated with lower levels of 
capital expenditures, a lower standard deviation of return on assets, a lower standard deviation of 
return on equity, and higher dividend payouts in China. Researchers have concluded that high 
dividend payouts in China are expropriations by insiders. Our results therefore imply that insiders 
increase the expropriation of outsiders by diverting resources for private motives as the conflict 
between the two parties escalates. Our finding of a negative impact of the shareholder base on firm 
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value in China further suggests that investors are concerned about the motives of insiders as agency 
conflicts intensify. Consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982), our results imply that the 
shareholder base in China serves as a proxy for the agency conflict between insiders and outsiders 
of firms. Our results suggest that improvements to the legal system and corporate governance are 
important before an expanding shareholder base can have positive effects on firm behavior and 
firm value for countries that have a poor record of investor protection and where firms are heavily 
controlled by the state. 
Essay 2 focuses on the effect of shareholder base on earnings management. A large 
shareholder base is supposed to impose better controls on firm discretionary behavior, but it may 
not work in China as shareholders are relatively less sophisticated. In addition, the stock market 
of China has a relatively short history and investors may not have sufficient information and 
experience. In this essay, we examine the effects of the shareholder base on earning management 
in China in this study. Consistent with popular belief, we find that a larger shareholder base 
provides a monitoring effect on earnings management in China. However, investors in China are 
still relatively inexperienced and fail to see the link between earnings management and tunneling. 
Using a sample of more than 20,000 firm-year observations of publicly traded nonfinancial 
companies from 1998 to 2013, we find that we find a negative relation between discretionary 
accruals and the shareholder base. In addition, we also find some weak evidence that the 
shareholder base provides a controlling effect on real activities manipulation. Our results also show 
a positive relation between the shareholder base and tunneling activities in China. The rapid rise 
of the shareholder base in China provides insiders with more opportunities to extract private 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Our results suggest that improvements to the 
legal system and corporate governance are important before an expanding shareholder base can 
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benefit firms and all the shareholders for countries that have a poor record of investor protection 
and where firms are heavily controlled by the state. 
This dissertation adds to the scant literature on the shareholder base by examining the 
effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in China. Given that China is in 
the process of developing its capital markets, the findings on the shareholder base of firms in China 
may have significant policy implications. 
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ESSAY 1: EFFECTS OF THE SHAREHOLDER BASE ON FIRM BEHAVIOR AND 
FIRM VALUE IN CHINA 
 
0. ABSTRACT 
We examine the effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in China 
in this study. Contrary to popular belief, we find that a large shareholder base does not benefit 
firms in China. Our results suggest that a large shareholder base in China implies elevated agency 
conflicts between insiders and outsiders. We find that a larger shareholder base is associated with 
lower levels of capital expenditures, a lower standard deviation of return on assets, a lower 
standard deviation of return on equity, and higher dividend payouts in China. Researchers have 
concluded that high dividend payouts in China are expropriations by insiders. Our results therefore 
imply that insiders increase the expropriation of outsiders by diverting resources for private 
motives as the conflict between the two parties escalates. Our finding of a negative impact of the 
shareholder base on firm value in China further suggests that investors are concerned about the 
motives of insiders as agency conflicts intensify. Consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982), our 
results imply that the shareholder base in China serves as a proxy for the agency conflict between 
insiders and outsiders of firms. Our results suggest that improvements to the legal system and 
corporate governance are important before an expanding shareholder base can have positive effects 
on firm behavior and firm value for countries that have a poor record of investor protection and 
where firms are heavily controlled by the state.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most companies spend significant time and attention to managing their shareholder base 
out of the belief that significant stock market benefits can be reaped if they can identify and attract 
the right shareholders. According to a recent survey by the National Investor Relations Institute 
(NIRI) and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, 91 percent of 
companies discuss shareholder composition at the senior-executive level; 75 percent discuss this 
at the board level. The survey also finds that CEOs spend 4.2 days per quarter managing their 
shareholder base and more than three-quarters of firms see significant stock market benefits from 
managing their shareholder base. Consistent with the opinion of practitioners, many financial 
economists suggest that the shareholder base is an important determinant of firm value and 
corporate policies (Lins and Warnock 2004; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaley 2005; Bodnaruk 
and Ostberg 2013).  
Despite the importance of the shareholder base, research on the topic has been scant. In the 
extant literature, two strands of research are related to the shareholder base. The first strand of 
research associates the shareholder base with the recognition of the firm by investors and finds 
that firms with higher levels of investor recognition have higher share prices and enjoy above 
average valuation multiples (Merton 1987; Bodnaruk and Ostberg 2009; Richardson, Sloan, and 
You 2012; Green and Jame 2013). The findings of this strand of research in general support the 
view that a large shareholder base generates significant stock market benefits to the firm. The 
second strand of research focuses on agency conflicts and the role of shareholders in these 
conflicts. These studies, however, have reported conflicting results regarding the effect of the 
shareholder base on firm value. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that firm value is 
negatively affected when the number of shareholders increases and the ownership of the firm 
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becomes diffused. They attribute this to the agency problems caused by the inability of individual 
shareholders in monitoring firm managers. Similarly, Rozeff (1982), Demestz and Lehn (1985), 
and Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that a large and dispersed shareholder base makes the 
monitoring of managerial behavior difficult and aggravates agency conflicts among stakeholders. 
On the other hand, some studies that examine the relation between stock liquidity and firm value 
imply that a large shareholder base improves firm value. For example, Edmans (2009) and Admati 
and Pfleiderer (2009) argue that stock liquidity reduces managerial opportunism and improves 
firm value. Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) argue that liquidity increases the information content of 
performance-sensitive managerial compensation and thus improves firm performance. Thus, given 
the scant research on the shareholder base and the conflicting conclusions of related studies, we 
want to add to the literature by exploring the effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and 
firm value in China in this study.  
Our goal is to determine if the common belief held by business executives that a large 
shareholder base is beneficial to the firm is true in a foreign setting. In doing so, we examine the 
effects of the shareholder base on various aspects of firms in China. First of all, we examine if the 
shareholder base has a positive or negative impact on the risk-taking behavior of firms in China. 
An examination of firm risk-taking behavior is directly relevant for evaluating the effect of the 
shareholder base on firm value. Given that firms in China are on average significantly controlled 
or owned by the state, the conflict between insiders and outsiders dominate other forms of agency 
problems. Corporate risk-taking behavior is affected not just by the insiders’ explicit ownership, 
but also by the private benefits that they can capture, including the corporate cash flows that they 
plan to divert to themselves. The more important the private benefits are, the more risk averse the 
insiders are likely to be in directing corporate investment behavior. A large shareholder base may 
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dilute (strengthen) the influence of insiders and promote firm value-maximizing (value-
decreasing) risk-taking behavior. The second part of our analysis is to examine the effect of the 
shareholder base on dividend payout in China. In the literature, a large shareholder base has been 
associated with a high dividend payout as the distribution of free cash flow is deemed necessary 
to dampen the agency problems associated with a dispersed ownership. The effect of the 
shareholder base on dividend payout in China, however, is less than straightforward as researchers 
have concluded that dividend payout is a form of expropriation by insiders. Thus, a large 
shareholder base may reduce (increase) dividend payouts of firms in China if the influence of 
insiders is mitigated (elevated). An examination of the dividend payout in China helps determine 
if a large shareholder base is beneficial to the country’s business organizations. Our final analysis 
is to directly examine the effect of the shareholder base on firm value in China. The relation 
between ownership structure and firm value in the U.S. has been extensively investigated in the 
literature; similar research based on firms in China is significantly less. Specifically, the effect of 
the shareholder base on firm value in China has not been examined yet in the literature. An 
investigation of the effect of the shareholder base on firm value is particularly important for China 
because firm value is a relatively unfamiliar concept to most stock investors in China. There is 
widespread popular belief that the tremendous stock market growth in China in recent years has 
attracted sentiment-driven investors mainly. Eun and Huang (2007) for instance cite the Wall 
Street Journal (August 22, 2001) comparing the stock markets of China to “casinos, driven by fast 
money flows in and out of stocks with little regard for their underlying value.” A better 
understanding of firm value and the effect of the shareholder base may help investors in China 
behave in a more rational manner.  
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Several reasons motivate us to examine the shareholder base in China in this study. First, 
existing studies of the ownership structure of firms in China primarily focus on the effect of the 
controlling shareholders on firm behavior; the effect of the shareholder base in China has not been 
examined yet in the literature. Second, China presents an interesting case for examining the 
shareholder base because before the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were created in 
1991, publicly traded firms and individual investors virtually did not exist. According to the 2013 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Statistical Yearbook, the number of A-share stock 
trading accounts (each investor can only register for one trading account) increased from 58.5 
million to 171.9 million between 2000 and 2013 at an annual rate of eight percent; the number of 
B-share stock trading accounts increased from 0.025 million to 2.51 million over the same period 
an annual rate of 117.7 percent. The statistics suggest that the shareholder base in China has been 
growing at a phenomenal rate unseen in other countries and it presents an interesting opportunity 
for investigating the effect of the shareholder base that arises primarily because investors are 
enthusiastic about stock ownership. Third, there is some evidence that shareholders in China are 
eager to protect their interests by monitoring firm behavior. Chen, Ke and Yang (2013) find 
evidence that after the passage of an investor-friendly regulation in 2004 in China, firms that have 
a higher level of minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing proposals while 
the firm management also submits fewer proposals that may decrease firm value. Accordingly, a 
larger shareholder base may have some positive impacts on firm behavior in China. An 
investigation of the shareholder base in China may thus result in significant policy implications 
because the country is facing the challenging task of protecting minority shareholders’ interests as 
it develops its domestic financial markets. Given China’s poor record of investor protection and 
weak law enforcement, it is important to determine the role of the shareholder base in its 
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burgeoning capital markets. This is the first study to show how the shareholder base affects the 
quality of corporate behavior for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. Fourth, 
the extant literature has provided evidence that firms in China suffer significant agency costs due 
to the presence of state ownership and/or government related controlling shareholders. It would be 
of interest to know if a broad shareholder base could promote the monitoring of firm behavior as 
government-related ownership is diluted. Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that an optimal firm 
ownership structure generally involves some measure of dispersion, to avoid excessive control by 
specific shareholders. This hypothesis has not been tested yet in developing countries where firm 
ownership is concentrated; China provides an interesting platform for investigating the hypothesis.  
Using a sample of 20,125 firm-year observations of Chinese companies from 1998 to 2013, 
we find evidence suggesting that the shareholder base is a proxy for agency conflicts for firms in 
China. That is, an expansion of the shareholder base in China implies higher levels of expropriation 
of outsiders by insiders. Specifically, firms with a larger shareholder base have lower levels of 
capital expenditures, a lower standard deviation of return on assets (σ[ROA]), and a lower standard 
deviation of return on equity (σ[ROE]). In addition, a larger shareholder base is associated with 
higher dividend payouts by firms in China. Researchers have concluded that the high dividend 
payouts in China are expropriations by outsiders. Our results on firm risk-taking behavior and 
dividend payout are thus consistent with the extensive evidence documented in existing studies 
that corporate resources of firms in China are frequently expropriated to satisfy the private motives 
of insiders. We also find that the shareholder base has a negative impact on firm value in China. 
The finding implies that investors are skeptical of the motives of insiders as the conflict between 
insiders and outsiders escalate. These results are consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982) that a 
larger shareholder base implies higher levels of agency conflicts.  
10 
 
 
Our study adds to the scant literature on the shareholder base by examining the effects of the 
shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in China. Our results are in general consistent 
with the existing literature that outsiders are expropriated by insiders of firms in China (Huang, 
Shen, and Sun 2011; Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2010). Given that China is in the process of 
developing its capital markets, our findings on the shareholder base of firms in China may have 
significant policy implications. Our results also add to the literature on investor protection by 
showing that in countries where investor protection is poor and law enforcement is weak, 
expanding the shareholder base is unlikely to aid the development of the capital markets as 
investors are skeptical of the motives of insiders. Our results resonate with the view of Lins and 
Warnock (2004) that investors are typically attracted only to firms in countries that have good 
governance practices and good law enforcements. Our investigation also adds to the literature on 
the influence of state ownership on firm behavior by showing that an expanding shareholder base 
does not improve the monitoring of firms where state ownership is significant and corporate 
governance is poor. In the case of China, our findings suggest that regulations and governance 
practices must be improved before the shareholder base can have positive effects on firm policies 
and firm value.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and discusses 
the research questions. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 presents analysis and 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Practitioners recognize that the shareholder base is important for many corporate decisions. For 
example, Wolfe Axelrod Weinberger Associates LLC, an investor relations company, states in its 
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company profile, “Our efforts culminate in a broader shareholder base, increased liquidity, a lower 
future cost of capital, and a better valuation relative to the client’s peer group.”1  Capital Link, 
another investor relations consulting firm, stipulates on its website, “We assist our clients to 
position themselves properly in the investment community, expand their shareholder base, secure 
analyst and media coverage and achieve a sustainable valuation.”2 Academic researchers also 
consider that the shareholder base is an important determinant of firm decisions (Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaley 2005; Bodnaruk and Ostberg 2013; Beyer, Larcker, and Tayan 2014). In 
spite of the apparent importance of the shareholder base, direct evidence detailing the impact of 
the shareholder base on corporate decisions has been scant. Our goal in this study is to determine 
if the common belief held by business executives that a large shareholder base is beneficial to the 
firm is true in a foreign setting. To achieve our goal, we examine the effects of the shareholder 
base on firm behavior and firm value in China. 
 
2.1 THE SHAREHOLDER BASE AND FIRM RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR  
First of all, we investigate the relation between the shareholder base and firm risk-taking 
behavior in China. An examination of firm risk-taking behavior is directly relevant for determining 
if a large shareholder base is beneficial to the firm. Theoretically, when the shareholder base is 
small, firm ownership is likely concentrated and firm investment decisions are frequently 
influenced by a few large shareholders. Large shareholders in general have incentives to influence 
the firm to pursue risky projects in order to maximize firm profit (Amihud and Lev 1981; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986). Laeven and Levine (2009) provide supporting evidence by documenting a 
positive relation between risk-taking and ownership. Undiversified large shareholders, however, 
                                                 
1 See http://www.wolfeaxelrod.com/profile.htm 
2 See http://www.capitallink.com/products_&_services.html 
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tend to prefer conservative projects in order to protect their own interests (John, Litov and Yeung 
2008; Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2011). When the shareholder base is broad and individual 
ownership becomes small, shareholders are likely neutral towards firm risk-taking behavior 
because the cost of monitoring the firm is high and firm-specific risk can be diversified away 
efficiently (Easterbrook 1984; Pagano and Roell 1998). However, Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) 
find a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm capital expenditures because improved 
stock liquidity reduces the cost of capital; their results imply that a larger shareholder base is likely 
to have a positive effect on the risk-taking behavior of firms. Gadhoum and Ayadi (2003) examine 
Canadian firms and find a nonlinear relationship between ownership and risk; their results show 
that risk-taking is high at low and high levels of ownership. Thus, the relation between the 
shareholder base and firm risk-taking is less than straight forward.  
State ownership is significant among firms in China. In 2013, the average state ownership 
reached almost 40%. In addition to state ownership, firms in China are typically controlled by a 
few large controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders are frequently related to the 
government and the managers of large firms are usually appointed by the state, thus the conflict of 
interest between large and small owners (the insider/outsider problem of Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) supersedes the agency conflict between shareholders and management. Firm risk-taking 
decisions in China as a result are likely dominated by insiders, that is, the state. In a country where 
corporate governance is poor and legal enforcement is weak, a direct outcome of a large ownership 
by the state is that the investment policies implemented in firms are likely to be conservative (John 
et al. 2008). Among the existing studies on the impact of state ownership on firm investment 
activity in China, Tan (2001) find that managers of large state-owned enterprises are less willing 
to assume risks than entrepreneurs of small privately-owned enterprises. Consistent with this view, 
13 
 
 
Huang, Shen, and Sun (2011) find that state ownership is associated with conservative corporate 
risk-taking behavior in China. A likely reason is because bureaucrats and state agencies do not 
have incentives to maximize firm value; they prefer a conservative investment approach that is 
consistent with the governmental emphasis on political and economic stability (Zou and Adams, 
2008). Accordingly, our first analysis is to examine whether a large shareholder base has positive 
impacts on the conservative risk-taking behavior of firms in China. The shareholder base in China 
has increased significantly in recent years while the average state ownership of firms has declined 
only moderately from 47% in 1998 to 40% in 2013.  There are two possible effects of such a 
change on firm risk-taking behavior in China. On one hand, with the state ownership diluted by a 
larger shareholder base and regulations have been implemented to protect shareholder rights, a 
large shareholder base implies that individual shareholders may exert influences that are opposite 
to the opinion of the state. This is a possible outcome that is consistent with the results of Chen et 
al. (2013).  Thus, a large shareholder base in China may have an offsetting effect on the 
conservative impact of state ownership on firm investment activity. On the other hand, if the 
shareholder base is a proxy for the degree to which the firm is exposed to agency costs as suggested 
by Rozeff (1982), then a larger shareholder base may aggravate the extraction of benefits by the 
controlling shareholders. That is, the shareholder base has no restraining effects on the influence 
of state ownership on firm investment activity. The mixed theoretical possibilities motivate our 
empirical investigation.  
 
2.2 THE SHAREHOLDER BASE AND DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
The second part of our investigation is to examine the effect of the shareholder base on 
dividend payout in China. There are two competing views in the literature on the relation between 
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the shareholder base and dividend payout. On one hand, Rozeff (1982) find a positive relation 
between dividend payout and the number of shareholders. He argues that the number of 
shareholders is a proxy for the agency costs facing a firm; therefore, firms dissipate free cash flows 
by paying more dividends to control agency conflicts as the shareholder base becomes larger. 
Consistent with this view, many researchers find that dividends are paid to disperse the free cash 
flow of a firm in order to mitigate agency problems (Jensen 1986; Lang and Litzenberger 1989). 
This strand of research implies that a larger shareholder base is associated with a higher dividend 
payout. Without relying on the agency cost argument, Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013) also find a 
positive relation between the shareholder base and dividend payout because a larger shareholder 
base implies lower costs of external financing. On the other hand, Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt 
(2007) find that firms that have a low stock liquidity pay more dividends in order to satisfy 
investors’ need for liquidity. Their results imply a negative relation between dividend payout and 
the shareholder base.   
Given the concentrated ownership of firms in China, researchers generally regard corporate 
dividend payout as a form of expropriation by the controlling shareholders (Lee and Xiao 2007; 
Wei and Xiao 2009; Cheng, Fung, and Leung 2009; Chen, Jian and Xu 2009; Lin, Chiou and Chen 
2010; Huang, Shen and Sun 2011; Liu, Uchida and Yang 2014). For example, Chen et al. (2009) 
find that Chinese firms with higher levels of concentrated ownership pay more dividends to satisfy 
the tunneling needs of the controlling shareholders. Su, Fung, Huang, and Shen (2014) and Liu et 
al. (2014) argue that the preference for cash dividends by the controlling shareholders in China is 
evidence of wealth expropriation given that the shares held by them are typically non-negotiable. 
The findings of these researchers are consistent with the prediction of John et al. (2008) that firms 
with high insider holdings are likely to siphon off cash flows for private benefits.  The effect of a 
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large shareholder base on the dividend payouts of firms in China, however, can be either positive 
or negative. If the minority shareholders in China are strong enough to exert their influences, as 
documented by Chen, Ke, and Yang (2013), then a larger shareholder base can mitigate the 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders and result in a lower dividend payout. On the other 
hand, if the minority shareholders are weak, a larger shareholder base may exacerbate the 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders and result in a higher dividend payout. In a cross-
country study, Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) show that high dividend payouts alleviate the 
expropriation of outsiders by insiders in Europe but exacerbate it in Asia. We seek to find out if 
the shareholder base mitigates or exacerbates expropriations by insiders through dividend payouts 
of firms in China.   
  
2.3 THE SHAREHOLDER BASE AND FIRM VALUE 
As the shareholder base is likely an important determinant of corporate decisions, its effect 
on firm value cannot be ignored. Thus, the last part of our investigation is to examine the relation 
between the shareholder base and firm value in China. One strand of studies suggests that the size 
of the shareholder base has a positive impact on firm value. For example, Merton (1987) finds that 
firms with a larger number of investors are better recognized in the stock market and tend to have 
valuation multiples. Related to Merton’s investor recognition hypothesis, some studies show that 
share prices of foreign stocks go up when their corresponding American Depository Receipts are 
listed on US stock exchanges; researchers attribute this to the higher investor recognition and 
liquidity, that is, a larger shareholder base, achieved by the listing effect (Kadlec and McConnell 
1994; Foerster and Karolyi 1999).  On the other hand, another strand of research that examines 
agency problems and firm value suggests that a large and dispersed ownership structure has a 
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negative effect on firm value as agency conflicts intensify (Rozeff 1982; Konijn, Kräussl, and 
Lucas 2011). However, mixed results have been found in this strand of research (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Holderness and Sheehan 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes 1990). Konijn et al. (2011) argue that the mixed results are caused by differences in 
regional and institutional characteristics.  
Existing studies on firm value in China overwhelmingly document a negative effect of state 
ownership on firm value (Wei, Xie, and Zhang 2005; Lei and Song 2013; Xiao and Zhao 2014). It 
is generally argued that because the controlling shareholders of firms in China have no incentives 
to maximize firm value as the shares they own are non-tradable.  Lei and Song (2011) find that 
firms with high levels of state ownership are associated with higher levels of related party 
transactions, which are typical channels for the controlling shareholders to tunnel firm resources 
for private benefits. Xiao and Zhao (2014) find that firms with excess control rights are associated 
with higher levels of agency conflicts and have a lower firm value. Gunasekarage, Hess and Hu 
(2007) and Shan and McIver (2011) find a negative, albeit weak, relation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in China.  
The last part of our investigation in this study is to examine if the shareholder base could 
generate a positive effect on firm value in China. Despite a larger shareholder base implies 
dispersed ownership, Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that an optimal firm ownership structure 
generally involves some measure of dispersion in order to avoid excessive control by specific 
shareholders. To the extent that firm value goes up when the excessive influence of the controlling 
shareholders is mitigated and when investor recognition improves, a larger shareholder base may 
enhance firm value in China.  
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3. DATA 
Our sample of 20,125 firm-year observations includes all the publicly traded non-financial 
firms in China between 1998 and 2013. The source of the data is the China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) Database, which provides yearly financial reports, equity trading and corporate 
governance information on companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
Consistent with previous studies, missing values of data are filled manually using internet available 
information from http://finance.sina.com.cn/. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize the 
financial variables with extreme values at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
In Table 1.1, we provide definitions of the variables used in the study. Many of the firm-
level variables are same as those used in Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013) and Faccio et al. (2011).  
 
[Insert Table 1.1 about here] 
 
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. It includes the mean, median, 
standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles. The average firm in our sample has 50,752 
shareholders of record (Shareholder Base); the median firm has 30,823 shareholders. The mean 
and median values of firm size, measured by Market Capitalization, are RMB 6.73 billion and 
RMB 2.93 billion, respectively. The mean (median) total assets is RMB 5.23 billion (1.87 billion). 
Sales volume has a mean (median) of RMB 3.63 billion (1.03 billion). Capital expenditures to total 
assets ratio has a mean of 0.07 and a median of 0.05; these numbers are comparable to recent US 
data (Ramalingegowda, Wang and Yu, 2013). On average, firm cash holdings represent 20.17% 
of total assets, which is in line with the findings of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) 
and Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013) for firms in the United States. Dividend payout ratio, computed 
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as dividends divided by sales, has a mean of 5.96% and a median of 4.01%. Book-to-market ratio 
has a mean (median) of 0.40 (0.35). Stock liquidity has a mean (median) of 2.87 (1.76). Stock 
liquidity is high relative to firms in the U.S. (Bodnaruk and Osteberg, 2013), suggesting that 
investors in China have a keen interest in stock trading. Firms in the sample are profitable 
operations with a mean (median) ROA of 5.72% (4.64%) and a mean (median) ROE of 8.93% 
(7.87%).  The firms have an average 1-year buy-and-hold stock return of 21.75%. On average, 
firm age is in excess of 10 years.  
 
[Insert Table 1.2 about here] 
 
3.1 MEASURES OF THE SHAREHOLDER BASE 
We use two measures of the shareholder base in this study. The first measure is the raw 
shareholder base, computed as the natural logarithmic value of the number of registered 
shareholders in order to control for the skewness in the distribution of the variable. The second 
measure is the excess shareholder base, computed using the model developed by Bodnaruk and 
Ostberg (2013). The regression equation is as follows:  
𝐿𝑛 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖  log (1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)  𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  
                                           + 𝛽3𝑖 log (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝)  𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖 log(
𝐵
𝑀
)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖 (
1
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
) 𝑖𝑡  
                                           + 𝛽6𝑖 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡   
                                           +𝛽8𝑖 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠           
                                           + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (1) 
In this estimation model, the logarithmic value of the number of shareholders (LogSH) is 
the dependent variable. The independent variables include firm age, return on equity, B/M ratio, 
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market capitalization, 1/share price, stock liquidity, past year return, and volatility.  We define the 
regression residuals of equation (1) as Excess Shareholder Base (ExShBase). In the regression, we 
control for market capitalization because larger firms are likely to have more shareholders due to 
higher levels of media coverage and investor recognition. Stock liquidity controls for volume-
based liquidity. In addition, 1/share price controls for the liquidity associated with transaction 
costs. Firm age and volatility control for firm risk. Return on equity and past year return control 
for the impact of recent performance on the number of shareholders. Book-to-market ratio controls 
for the effect of stock valuation on the shareholder base.  
Table 1.3 presents the regression result of equation (1). The result is qualitatively similar 
to what Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013) find. The result shows that large, value, and older firms have 
more shareholders. In addition, firms that have a high 1/share price and stock liquidity also have 
more shareholders. The two measures of recent performance, return on equity and past year return, 
show contradictory effects on the number of shareholders.  
 
[Insert Table 1.3 about here] 
 
According to Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013), it is important that the shareholder base is a 
persistent firm characteristic instead of a temporary phenomenon if the shareholder base is to have 
systematic effects on firm decisions. Thus, we begin by determining if the shareholder base in 
China is stable and persistent. Following Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013), we separate firms into 
quartiles based on the raw (excess) shareholder base. Firms in quartile 4 (1) have the largest 
(smallest) shareholder base. After identifying a firm’s first entry into quartile 4 (1), we record 
which quartile the firm belongs to over the following five years. As can be seen in Table 1.4, about 
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96% (69%) of the firms remain in the top two quartiles of the raw (excess) shareholder base 
throughout the five-year period after entering quartile 4. In addition, 74% (45%) of the firms stay 
in the largest raw (excess) shareholder base quartile during the five-year interval. 61% (48%) of 
the firms originally in quartile 1 of the raw (excess) shareholder base remain in the bottom two 
quartiles in the following four years. In sum, the results in Table 4 suggest that the raw (excess) 
shareholder base in China is persistent.  
 
[Insert Table 1.4 about here] 
 
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Table 1.5 reports univariate results comparing the characteristics of firms with a large 
shareholder base (quartile 4) and firms with a small shareholder base (quartile 1). In panel A, we 
report results based on the raw shareholder base (LogSH). As can be seen in panel A, all the mean 
differences and median differences are significant at the one percent level. As expected, firms with 
a small shareholder base are smaller than firms with a large shareholder base in terms of total 
assets, sales revenue, and operating cash flow. The mean (median) total assets of firms with a small 
shareholder base is RMB 2,080 million (1,207 million) compared to RMB 21,601 million (5,293 
million) of firms with a large shareholder base. The mean (median) sales revenue of firms with a 
small shareholder base is RMB 1,693 million (716 million) compared to RMB 17,831 million 
(2,749 million) of firms with a large shareholder base. The mean (median) operating cash flow of 
firms with a small shareholder base is RMB 118 million (55 million) compared to RMB 1,630 
million (231 million) of firms with a large shareholder base. Firms that have fewer shareholders 
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also have a lower leverage. The mean (median) leverage ratio of firms in quartile 1 is 42.16% 
(42.40%) compared to 48.84% (50.18%) of firms in quartile 4. In terms of performance, firms with 
a small shareholder base outperform firms with a large shareholder base. The mean (median) ROE 
of firms in quartile 1 is 10.25% (8.76%) compared to 8.42% (7.10%) of firms in quartile 4. Similar 
patterns are found when comparing their sales growth and ROA. The results in panel A also show 
that firms with a large shareholder base hold less cash (Cash/TA) and pay more cash dividends 
than firms with a small shareholder base. These findings are consistent with the result of Bodnaruk 
and Ostberg (2013) on US firms. Firms with a large shareholder base have lower levels of capital 
expenditures (Capex/TA) than firms with a small shareholder base, with or without adjusting for 
the industry mean (median).  
Panel B of Table 1.5 reports univariate results comparing the characteristics of firms with 
a positive excess shareholder base (that is, a large shareholder base) and firms with a negative 
excess shareholder base (that is, a small shareholder base). With a few exceptions, the results in 
panel B of Table 5 are very similar to what we have observed in panel A. Firms with a negative 
excess shareholder base are smaller in terms of total assets, sales revenue, and operating cash flow. 
Firms with a negative excess shareholder base outperform firms with a positive excess shareholder 
base in terms of ROE, ROA, and Sales growth. Firms with a negative excess shareholder base have 
more cash holdings, less leverage, and higher levels of capital expenditures. Unlike the result based 
on the raw shareholder base, panel B shows that there is no difference in dividend payouts between 
firms with a negative excess shareholder base and firms with a positive excess shareholder base.  
 
[Insert Table 1.5 about here] 
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4.2 SHAREHOLDER BASE AND RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 
To analyze the impact of the shareholder base on firm risk-taking behavior, we augment standard 
firm risk-taking regression models by adding the shareholder base as the independent variable of 
interest.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  
                                            +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠   + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (2) 
where risk-taking activity is measured by capital expenditure divided by total assets (CapEx_TA), 
the standard deviation of ROA(t, t+4), and the standard deviation of ROE(t, t+4), respectively. In 
addition, the dependent variable is measured by the raw, industry mean-adjusted, and industry 
median-adjusted value, respectively. We abbreviate the standard deviation of ROA(t, t+4) by 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and the standard deviation of ROE(t, t+4) by σ[ROE(t,t+4)] hereafter. The control 
variables, Xit, are firm age (measured by Log(1+firm age)), prior year buy-and-hold stock return, 
cash holdings (measured by Ln(Cash/TA)), earnings (measured as Ln(EBITDA/TA)), growth 
opportunities (measured by Ln(B/M ratio)), leverage (measured by total liabilities/total assets), 
and log(sales). Also included is a (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of one if the firm is 
ultimately controlled by the state, and is zero otherwise. Lagged values of independent variables 
are used in the estimation in order to control for potential endogeneity problems. We also control 
for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in the model. 
In Table 1.6, regression results using equation (2) with the dependent variable measured 
by CapEx_TA are reported. In columns (1) to (3), regression results based on the raw shareholder 
base (LogSH) are reported. In columns (4) to (6), regression results based on the excess 
shareholder base are reported. As can be seen in Table 6, the coefficient on the raw shareholder 
base is negative and significant at the one percent level in columns (1) to (3).  The economic impact 
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of the shareholder base on capital expenditure is considerable. For example, in column (1), the 
coefficient on the raw shareholder base is -0.0033 with a p-value of 0.0000. Evaluating CapEx_TA 
at its mean level, an increase in LogSH from the first to the third quartile of the distribution results 
in a 6.37% decrease in CapEx_TA. Similar results can be found in columns (2) and (3). The results 
suggest that a larger shareholder base is associated with reduced capital expenditures. The results 
are contradictory to the finding of Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) based on US data. Instead, the 
reductions in capital expenditures by firms in China as the shareholder base expands are consistent 
with the view of Rozeff (1982) that the shareholder base is a proxy for agency conflicts. For firms 
in China, a larger shareholder base implies that insiders heighten the expropriation of outsiders 
and divert corporate resources from firm investment activity for private motives as the conflicts 
with outsiders escalate. This interpretation is consistent with the extensive evidence on tunneling 
by insiders among firms in China (Gao and Kling 2008; Chen et al. 2009; Aharony, Wang and 
Yuan 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010). The negative effect of the shareholder base on risk-taking 
by firms in China is likely associated with the weak corporate governance of the country. In 
columns (4) to (6), the coefficient on the excess shareholder base is also negative, despite 
insignificant. That is, we only have fair evidence in Table 6 that the shareholder base negatively 
impacts risk-taking by firms in China.  
Although it is not the main focus of this paper, Table 1.6 also provides information about 
other conventional determinants of risk-taking activity. The regression coefficients on these 
determinants have signs that are largely consistent with those identified using U.S. data. For 
example, sales volume has an expected positive coefficient as larger firms are likely to invest more. 
The coefficient on earnings (EBITDA/TA) is positive and significant at the one percent level in 
columns (1) to (6), suggesting that higher earnings enable firms to invest more and assume more 
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risk.  Similar to prior studies, sales growth has a positive effect on capital expenditures (Harford, 
Mansi and Maxwell 2008). On the other hand, leverage has a significant negative effect on capital 
expenditures in columns (1) to (6).  Firm age also has a significant negative effect on CapEx_TA; 
a likely reason is that older firms have fewer growth opportunities. Consistent with prior studies, 
state ownership has a negative effect on CapEx_TA. The result suggests firms that are controlled 
by the state are more conservative and less interested in maximizing firm value.  Finally, firms that 
hold more cash and firms with a lower book-to-market ratio spend less on capital expenditures.  
 
[Insert Table 1.6 about here] 
 
The regression results of equation (2) with σ[ROA(t,t+4)] as the dependent variable are 
reported in Table 1.7. In columns (1) to (3), regression results based on the raw shareholder base 
(LogSH) are reported. In columns (4) to (6), regression results based on the excess shareholder 
base are reported. As can be seen in Table 1.7, the shareholder base has a strong negative effect 
on σ[ROA(t,t+4)]. The coefficient on the shareholder base is negative and significant at the one 
percent level in columns (1) to (3); it is significant at the five percent level in columns (5) and (6). 
The results are stronger than those observed in Table 1.6 where the dependent variable is capital 
expenditure. The economic impact of the shareholder base on σ[ROA(t,t+4)] is considerable. For 
example, in column (1), the coefficient on the raw shareholder base is -0.1799 with a p-value of 
0.0003. Evaluating σ[ROA(t,t+4)] at its mean value, an increase in LogSH from the first to the 
third quartile of the distribution results in a 4.57% decrease in the standard deviation of ROA. 
Similarly results can be observed in columns (5) and (6) where the excess shareholder base is used. 
Over all, the results in Table 1.7 show that a larger shareholder base is associated with lower levels 
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of σ[ROA(t,t+4)] for firms in China, implying that firm resources may have been diverted from 
firm investment activity as the shareholder base expands. The results are consistent with the view 
of Rozeff (1982) that agency conflicts are elevated as the shareholder base expands, resulting in 
the diversion of resources to satisfy the private motives of insiders.  The results are also consistent 
with the existing literature that firms in China suffer from significant expropriations by insiders 
(Aharony, Wang and Yuan 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010). 
 
[Insert Table 1.7 about here] 
 
In Table 1.8, regression results using equation (2) with the dependent variable measured 
by σ[ROE(t,t+4)] are reported. ROE is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity. The standard 
deviation of ROE reflects both the riskiness of a firm’s projects and the additional risk associated 
with the use of leverage in the capital structure. The measure has been used in previous studies as 
an indicator of firm riskiness (Faccio et al. 2011). As can be seen in Table 8, the coefficient on the 
raw shareholder base is negative and significant at the one percent level in columns (1) to (3). The 
coefficient on the excess shareholder base is negative and significant at the five percent level in 
column (4); it is significant at the one percent level in columns (5) and (6). The results imply that 
lower levels of firm risk-taking are associated with a larger shareholder base. The results in Table 
8 are similar to those in Tables 6 and 7, that is, firms in China cut back risk-taking activities when 
the shareholder base expands. Since σ[ROE(t,t+4)] also reflects the risk associated with firm 
leverage, a negative coefficient on the raw (excess) shareholder base implies that firms in China 
also reduce leverage as the shareholder base expands.  That is, firm leverage declines as the agency 
conflict between insiders and outsiders escalates in China. As reported in section 2.1, the average 
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state ownership of firm in China remains at a relatively high level of about 40% in 2013 in China 
despite an expanding shareholder base. Based on a sample of French firms, Bruslerie et al. (2012) 
report that firm leverage declines when the ownership of the controlling shareholders exceeds 
40%. The authors argue that it is because the controlling shareholders want to avoid the monitoring 
effect of debt and deter potential financial distress associated with a high leverage so that they 
could keep on expropriating outsiders undisturbed. The results in Table 8 support the view of 
Bruslerie and Latrous (2012). 
Summarizing the results in Tables 1.6 to 1.8, we have strong evidence that a larger 
shareholder base is associated with lower levels of risk-taking by firms in China. This observation 
applies to firm investment and financing decisions.   
 
[Insert Table 1.8 about here] 
 
4.3 THE SHAREHOLDER BASE AND DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013) find that firms with larger shareholder bases have higher 
payout levels. They attribute the positive relation between the shareholder base and dividend 
payout to the lower cost of external financing faced by firms with a large shareholder base. In this 
section, we examine the effect of the shareholder base on the dividend payouts of firms in China. 
Our regression equation is 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  
                                            + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠   + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (3) 
where dividend payout ratio is measured by cash dividends divided by sales. The control variables 
are same as those in equation (2). In addition, retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA) is added in 
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order to be consistent with other studies (Chay and Suh 2009; Francis, Hasan, John, and Song 
2010).  
Table 1.9 reports the regression results of equation (3). In columns (1) to (3), the raw 
shareholder base (LogSH) is used. In columns (4) to (6), the excess shareholder base (ExShBase) 
is used. The coefficient on the raw shareholder base is positive and significant at the one percent 
level in columns (1) to (3). In column (1), the coefficient on the raw shareholder base is 0.0141 
with a p-value of 0.0000. Evaluating dividend payout ratio at its mean level, an increase in the raw 
shareholder base from the first to the third quartile of the distribution results a 30.16% increase in 
the dividend payout ratio. Despite the positive relation between the shareholder base and dividend 
payouts of firms in China is consistent with the evidence on US firms reported by Bodnaruk and 
Ostberg (2013), the underlying motivation may be different for firms in China. As concluded by 
many researchers, dividends represent expropriations by insiders of firms in China (Cheng et al. 
2009; Chen et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2010; Huang et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2014). Accordingly, the 
positive correlation between the shareholder base and dividend payouts of firms in China could 
imply that insiders intensify their expropriations of the firm as agency conflicts between insiders 
and outsiders escalate in the face of an expanding shareholder base. This interpretation is consistent 
with the results observed in Tables 1.6 to 1.8 on the effect of the shareholder base on the risk-
taking behavior of firms in China. In a cross-country study, Faccio et al. (2001) report that high 
dividend payouts alleviate the expropriation of outsiders by insiders in Europe but exacerbate it in 
Asia. Thus, the results reported in Table 9 are in line with the expropriation argument. However, 
the coefficient on the excess shareholder base is insignificant in columns (4) to (6). Therefore we 
only have fair results in Table 1.9. 
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[Insert Table 1.9 about here] 
 
4.4 THE SHAREHOLDER BASE AND FIRM VALUE 
Given the observed effects of the shareholder base on firm decisions, an investigation of 
the effect of the shareholder base on firm value in China is warranted. We use the firm valuation 
model of Fama and French (1998) for the investigation. The model has been shown to give robust 
results under different conditions. To take into consideration the effects of the shareholder base on 
firm decisions, we also add a shareholder base interaction variable to the model. The shareholder 
base interaction variable is computed as shareholder base*industry-adjusted CapEx/TA, 
shareholder base*industry-adjusted σ[ROA(t, t+4)], shareholder base* industry-adjusted σ[ROE(t, 
t+4)], and shareholder base*industry-adjusted dividend payout ratio, respectively. Our model has 
the following specification: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽2𝑖𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽3𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                (4) 
The dependent variable, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 , is computed as market capitalization plus total 
debt to total assets (MV/TA) as in Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) and Bates, Kahle and 
Stulz (2009). 𝑋𝑖𝑡  represents the control variables used by Fama and French (1998) in the 
regression. They include past changes, future changes and current levels of earnings, financial 
expenses, dividends, as well as past and future changes in assets and future changes in market 
value, all scaled by the total assets of the firm. To reduce the autocorrelation, we add lagged market 
value as independent variables. We also include state dummy and control for year fixed effects in 
the regression.  
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Regression results on the effect of the shareholder base on firm value using equation (4) 
are reported in Table 1.10. In columns (1) to (4), the raw shareholder base is used. In columns (5) 
to (8), the excess shareholder base is used. The focus of attention in this table is the coefficient on 
the shareholder base and the coefficient on the shareholder base interaction variable. The results 
show that the shareholder base has a negative effect on firm value in China as the coefficient on 
the shareholder base in columns (1) to (8) is negative and significant with a p-value of 0.0000. 
This finding is contradictory to the implication of the investor recognition hypothesis of Merton 
(1988) that firm value increases as the number of shareholder goes up. The finding is also 
contradictory to the evidence based on US firms that stock liquidity has a positive effect on firm 
value (Edmans 2009; Admati and Pfliederer 2009; Fang, Noe, and Tice 2009). The results imply 
there is something unique about the firms in China that leads to a negative effect of the shareholder 
base on firm value. A plausible explanation is that a larger shareholder base in China implies higher 
levels of agency conflicts and investors are concerned about the motives of the insiders. This 
explanation is consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982) that the number of shareholders is a proxy 
for the agency cost facing a firm; the explanation is supported by the results reported in Tables 6 
to 9. Despite a larger shareholder base in China also likely implies the presence of more 
institutional investors, a large body of literature argues that institutional investors in emerging 
markets tend to herd and engage in sentiment-driven trading (Choe, Kho and Stulz 1999; 
Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler 2004; Chen, Wang and Lin 2008). These findings suggest that 
the presence of institutional investors in the expanding shareholder base of China is not necessarily 
beneficial to firm value. In addition, Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) find evidence based on US firms 
that a higher stock liquidity implies the higher presence of institutional investors who do not 
monitor.  Thus, the negative effect of the shareholder base on firm value in China is consistent 
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with the agency argument that firm value declines as the expropriation by insiders escalates. 
Regarding the interaction between the shareholder base and firm activity, the coefficient on the 
shareholder base interaction variable is also negative in columns (1) to (8) despite it is only 
significant in column (2) and (3). In column (2), the coefficient on the interaction variable 
shareholder base *σ[ROA(t,t+4)] is -0.0049 with a p-value of 0.0035. Compared to the value of -
0.1636 for the coefficient on the shareholder base in this column, the interaction effect between 
the shareholder base and σ[ROA(t,t+4)] magnifies the negative effect of the shareholder base on 
firm value by about ten percent.  In column (3), we find the similar interaction effect between the 
shareholder base and σ[ROE(t,t+4)]. In sum, the results in Table 1.10 present strong evidence that 
the shareholder base has a negative impact on firm value in China. The finding has important 
policy implications as China is in the process of developing its capital markets. The results suggest 
that regulations and corporate governance practices in China must be improved before investors 
are attracted to the capital markets and are able to accept firm ownership with confidence. 
Consistent with this view, Lins and Warnock (2004) find that shareholders are only attracted to 
firms in emerging countries that have good governance practices.  
 
[Insert Table 1.10 about here] 
 
4.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
4.5.1 The effect of the institutional reform of 2005 
In 2005, the Chinese government implemented a reform aimed at eliminating the so-called 
non-tradable shares typically held by the state or by politically connected controlling shareholders. 
Researchers suggest that before the reform insiders of firms in China had incentives to tunnel 
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corporate resources for personal needs because they were unable to realize the value of their stock 
holdings. One of the objectives of the reform was to provide a proper channel for insiders to realize 
the value of their equity holdings in the market and thus mitigate the incentive to expropriate 
corporate resources for personal motives.  Accordingly, we expect the expropriation of outsiders 
by insiders to become less after 2005. In other words, we expect the function of the shareholder 
base to serve as a proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders to decline after the 
2005 reform. To confirm our prediction, we examine if the coefficient on the shareholder base 
changes in the post reform period. The results are reported in Table 1.11.  
In Panel A of Table 1.11, we report only the regression coefficient on the shareholder base 
for brevity sake. As can be seen in Panel A in the regressions that examine the effect of the 
shareholder base on capital expenditures, the negative coefficient on the raw shareholder base 
indeed becomes smaller in the post-reform period. For example, the coefficient on the raw 
shareholder base is -0.0030 in the post-reform period compared to -0.0054 in the pre-reform period 
where capital expenditure is measured by unadjusted CapEx/TA. Similar results are found when 
industry mean-adjusted and industry median-adjusted CapEx/TA are used. The results imply that 
after the 2005 reform, the effect of the shareholder base as a proxy for agency conflicts between 
insiders and outsiders in China has declined. However, the coefficient on the excess shareholder 
base is insignificant in the pre- and post-2005 periods in the capital expenditure regressions. The 
results of the σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and σ[ROE(t,t+4)] regressions produce conflicting results for our 
prediction. For example, the coefficient on the raw shareholder base in these regressions is more 
negative after 2005. The coefficient on the excess shareholder base of the σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and 
σ[ROE(t,t+4)] regressions, on the other hand, provide mixed results. Thus, we have mixed results 
in panel A on the effect of the shareholder base on firm risk-taking behavior in China in this 
32 
 
 
robustness test. Regarding dividend payout, the coefficient on the raw shareholder base in the post-
reform period is more than 50% smaller than the coefficient in the pre-reform period; the 
coefficient on the excess shareholder base is negative compared to the positive coefficient in the 
pre-reform period. The results on dividend payout show that the expropriation by insiders in the 
form of high dividend payouts is reduced after the 2005 reform. Thus, the results on dividend 
payout are consistent with our prediction and strongly suggest that the shareholder base is a proxy 
for agency conflicts in China.  
In Panel B of Table 1.11, we compare the effect of the shareholder base on firm value in 
China before and after the 2005 reform. If the 2005 reform is effective, we expect the negative 
effect of the shareholder base on firm value in China to decline. Consistent with the whole period 
results reported in Table 10, the coefficient on the shareholder base is negative before and after the 
reform. The negative coefficient on the raw shareholder base after the reform is about 5% smaller 
than before the reform whereas the negative coefficient on the excess shareholder after the reform 
is significantly smaller (about 35%) than before the reform. The results imply that the negative 
effect of the shareholder base on firm value is China is significantly reduced after the reform. That 
is, the results in Panel B of Table 1.11 support the view that the shareholder base in China is a 
proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders in China.  
 
[Insert Table 1.11 about here] 
 
4.5.2 The effect of foreign equity owners 
Consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982), our main regression results in Tables 1.6 to 1.10 
imply that the shareholder base is a proxy for agency conflicts for firms in China and that a large 
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shareholder base is not beneficial. In our second robustness test, we want to see if the presence of 
foreign equity owners could mitigate the conflict between outsiders and insiders in China. It is 
very likely foreign equity owners are more interested in maximizing the value of their investments 
than aligning their objectives with those of the state officials. Thus, the presence of foreign equity 
owners may provide a monitoring function that mitigates the expropriation by insiders. 
Accordingly, we expect the effect of the shareholder base to be less significant when foreign equity 
owners are present. 
In Panel A of Table 1.12, we report only the regression coefficient on the shareholder base 
for brevity sake. We divide the firms into two groups, those with foreign equity owners and those 
without foreign equity owners. As can be seen in Panel A, the negative effect of the raw 
shareholder base on CapEx/TA is insignificant for firms with foreign owners whereas the negative 
effect of the raw shareholder base on CapEx/TA is highly significant for firms without foreign 
owners. Similarly, the effect of the raw shareholder base on σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and σ[ROE(t,t+4)]) is 
insignificant for firms with foreign owners whereas the effect of the raw shareholder base on 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and σ[ROE(t,t+4)]) is negative and highly significant for firms without foreign 
owners. The same can be observed regarding the the effect of the raw shareholder base on dividend 
payout. In sum, the results based on the raw shareholder base strongly support our view that that 
the shareholder base in China is a proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders and a 
large shareholder base is not beneficial to firms in China. The results based on excess shareholder 
base, however, is not as strong. For example, the coefficient on the excess shareholder base in the 
CapEx regressions is insignificant for firms with and without foreign equity owners. The results 
of the σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and σ[ROE(t,t+4)]) regressions provide strong support that the effect of the 
shareholder base is mitigated in the presence of foreign owners. For example, the coefficient on 
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the excess shareholder base is insignificant in all the σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and σ[ROE(t,t+4)]) 
regressions for firms with foreign equity owners whereas the coefficient is negative and significant 
in four of the six σ[ROA(t,t+4)] and σ[ROE(t,t+4)]) regressions for firm without foreign owners. 
That is, without the presence of foreign owners, firms with an excess shareholder base are less 
willing to pursue risk-taking activities. This is consistent with the main results reported earlier in 
Tables 1.6 to 1.8. Regarding dividend payout, the coefficient on the excess shareholder base is 
significantly negative for firms with foreign owners. This observation represents a major departure 
from the results reported earlier in Table 1.9 which show that the shareholder base has a positive 
effect on dividend payout. The results in Table 1.12 show that foreign equity ownership strongly 
reduces the effect of the shareholder base on dividend payout in China. 
In Panel B of Table 1.12, the negative effect of the raw shareholder base on firm value in 
China is smaller for firms with foreign owners. Surprisingly, the opposite is found when the excess 
shareholder base is used in the equation. Overall, we have very strong results on the effects of the 
shareholder base on firm risk-taking behavior and dividend payout but mixed results on the effect 
on firm value in Table 1.12. 
 
[Insert Table 1.12 about here] 
 
4.5.3. The effects of free cash flow and institutional investors 
Firms with significant free cash flows are more likely associated with agency conflicts. 
Therefore, the effect of the shareholder base is likely elevated among firms with high levels of free 
cash flow. On the other hand, the effect of the shareholder base may be less significant among 
firms with a high institutional ownership as there is ample evidence based on US data that 
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institutional investors can monitor firm behavior effectively. We perform additional robustness 
tests on subsamples based on free cash flow and institutional ownership. However, we obtained 
mixed results in these tests and they are therefore not tabulated. 
 
5. SUMMARY 
Business executives popularly believe that managing the shareholder base of a firm can 
lead to significant stock market benefits for the company. Although researchers concur that the 
shareholder base is an important determinant of corporate decisions, research on the shareholder 
base has been scant.  
This study examines the effects of the shareholder base on firm behavior and firm value in 
China. Using a sample of 20,125 firm-year observations of publicly traded nonfinancial companies 
from 1998 to 2013, we find that a large shareholder base is associated with reduced capital 
expenditures, a lower standard deviation of the return on assets and a lower standard deviation of 
the return on equity. Firms with a larger shareholder base are associated with higher dividend 
payouts. In addition, the shareholder base has a negative impact on firm value in China. Our results 
are consistent with the implication that the shareholder base in China is a proxy for agency conflicts 
between insiders and outsider. When the shareholder base expands, agency conflicts escalate and 
insiders increase their expropriations of outsiders by directing (tunneling) firm resources for 
private motives. Our results suggest that in countries where investor protection is poor, regulatory 
changes and improvements to governance practices must be made before the shareholder base can 
benefit the firm.    
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ESSAY 2: THE SHAREHOLDER BASE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 
0. ABSTRACT 
We examine the effects of the shareholder base on earnings management in China in this 
study. Consistent with popular belief, we find that a larger shareholder base provides a monitoring 
effect on earnings management in China. However, investors in China are still relatively 
inexperienced and fail to see the link between earnings management and tunneling. Specifically, 
we find a negative relation between discretionary accruals and the shareholder base. In addition, 
we find some weak evidence that the shareholder base provides a controlling effect on real 
activities manipulation. Our results also show a positive relation between the shareholder base and 
tunneling activities in China. The rapid rise of the shareholder base in China provides insiders with 
more opportunities to extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Our 
results suggest that improvements to the legal system and corporate governance are important 
before an expanding shareholder base can benefit firms and all the shareholders for countries that 
have a poor record of investor protection and where firms are heavily controlled by the state. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
High quality financial reporting is necessary for financial markets to operate efficiently 
(Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). It reduces shareholders’ and creditors’ monitoring and 
contracting costs as well as improves firms’ contracting terms (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2000, 2003; 
and Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). However, insiders often engage in earnings management as they 
may not have strong enough incentives to commit to quality financial reporting (Ball et al., 2000, 
2003; Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker, 2010; and Johnson, Fleischman, Valentine and Walker, 
2012). A major reason is that the separation of ownership and control in firms results in agency 
conflicts between managers and stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Managers, as a result, 
frequently manage corporate earnings to expropriate private benefits at the expense of shareholders 
and creditors (Leuz et al., 2003).  
Existing studies have found significant evidence of corporate earnings management in 
developed economies (Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). Recent investigations suggest that 
earnings management is also prevalent in developing countries (Leuz et al., 2003). Researchers 
have focused on finding evidence of earnings management, less attention has been paid to the 
examination of factors that can deter the phenomenon. The existing literature suggests that 
earnings management can be moderated if investor protection is strong and/or when the legal 
system is well developed (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler Hail and 
Leuz, 2006; and DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant, 2007). In addition, there is evidence that the 
presence of large shareholders has a monitoring effect on firm financial reporting behavior 
(Agrawal and Mandelker 1990; Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo, 2010). In this study, we extend the 
45 
 
 
literature by investigating if a large shareholder base can provide a disciplinary effect on earnings 
management in China.  
Practitioners have paid significant attention to the shareholder base. According to a survey 
by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance 
at Stanford University, 91 percent of companies discuss shareholder composition at the senior-
executive level and firm CEOs spend 4.2 days per quarter managing their shareholder base given 
the fact that more than three-quarters of firms see significant stock market benefits from managing 
their shareholder base. The shareholder base, however, has received relatively less attention from 
researchers (Bodnaruk and Ostberg, 2013).  Nevertheless, the effects of the shareholder holder 
base can be inferred from related studies in the finance literature. Following Merton (1987), a large 
shareholder base implies higher levels of investor recognition. As investors become more aware 
of the firm, the effect of market discipline on firm behavior is likely strengthened. Consistent with 
this implication, a large number of shareholders may reduce asymmetric information between 
insiders and outsiders (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) and thus discourages earnings management 
by insiders. The literature on the effects of stock liquidity also implies that a large shareholder base 
likely reduces managerial opportunism and improves firm value (Edmans, 2009; Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 2009). Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) argue that liquidity increases the information content 
of performance-sensitive managerial compensation and thus improves firm performance. Based 
on the above, one can argue that the shareholder base likely has a moderating effect on corporate 
earnings management. Some researchers, however, suggest that the shareholder base is basically 
a proxy for agency problem; that is, a larger shareholder base implies higher levels of agency 
conflicts. For example, Rozeff (1982), Demestz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), and 
Pagano and Roel (1998) find that firm value is negatively affected when the number of 
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shareholders increases and firm ownership becomes diffused. They attribute this to the agency 
problems caused by the inability of individual shareholders in monitoring firm managers.  
We focus our attention on the effects of the shareholder base on earnings management in 
China for several reasons. First, the effect of the shareholder base on earnings management in 
China has not been examined yet in the literature. The extant literature has provided evidence that 
firms in China suffer significant agency costs due to the presence of state ownership and/or 
government related controlling shareholders. For firms in China, the conflict between insiders and 
outsiders dominate other forms of agency problems. It would be of interest to know if a broad 
shareholder base could monitor firm earning management as government-related ownership is 
diluted. Second, China presents an interesting case for examining the shareholder base because 
before the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were created in 1991, publicly traded firms 
and individual investors virtually did not exist. According to the 2013 China Securities Depository 
and Clearing Statistical Yearbook, the number of A-share stock trading accounts (each investor 
can only register for one trading account) increased from 58.5 million to 171.9 million between 
2000 and 2013 at an annual rate of eight percent; the number of B-share stock trading accounts 
increased from 0.025 million to 2.51 million over the same period an annual rate of 117.7 percent. 
The statistics suggest that the shareholder base in China has been growing at a phenomenal rate 
unseen in other countries and it presents an interesting opportunity for investigating the effect of 
the shareholder base that arises primarily because investors are enthusiastic about stock ownership. 
Third, there is some evidence that shareholders in China are eager to protect their interests by 
monitoring firm behavior. Chen, Ke and Yang (2013) find evidence that after the passage of an 
investor-friendly regulation in 2004 in China, firms that have a higher level of minority 
shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing proposals while the firm management also 
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submits fewer proposals that may decrease firm value. Accordingly, a larger shareholder base may 
have a constraining effect on earnings management in China. This is the first study to show how 
the shareholder base affects the quality of corporate behavior for firms domiciled in weak investor 
protection countries.  
Following the existing literature on earnings management in China (Wang and Yung, 2011; 
Yang, Chi, and Young, 2012; Qi, Yang, and Tian, 2014; Zhu et al., 2015), we measure earnings 
management in China by discretionary accruals. We also investigate earnings management in 
China by examining real activities manipulation. According to Roychowdhury (2006), real 
activities manipulation includes price discounts to inflate sales temporarily, overproduction to 
lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported profit 
margins. We include the examination of real activities management in our investigation of earnings 
management in China because survey results suggest that firms are unlikely to rely solely on 
accrual manipulation to manage earnings (Bruns and Merchant, 1990; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2005).  In addition, we expand our investigation to also examine the effect on the 
shareholder base on tunneling by insiders in China because there is evidence that tunneling is an 
incentive for earnings management to extract economic resources from minority shareholders 
(Aharony, Wang, and Yuan, 2010).  According to Aharony et al. (2010), investors in China fail to 
see the link between earnings management and tunneling. We want to determine if a larger 
shareholder base arouses the attention of investors to the association between earnings 
management and tunneling.  
Using a sample of 20,937 firm-year observations that includes all the publicly traded non-
financial firms in China between 1998 and 2013, we find a negative relation between discretionary 
accruals and the shareholder base. In addition, we also find some weak evidence that the 
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shareholder base provides a controlling effect on real activities manipulation by firms in China. 
The results are consistent with the implications of the existing literature (Merton, 1987; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1993; Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Fang et al., 2009) that a large 
shareholder base is good for investors. Our results also show a positive relation between the 
shareholder base and tunneling activities in China. The finding is consistent with the results of 
Aharony et al. (2010) that investors in China fail to see a link between earnings management and 
tunneling. The finding implies that despite a larger shareholder base provides a monitoring effect 
on earnings management in China, investors in China are still relatively inexperienced and fail to 
see the link between earnings management and tunneling. The rapid rise of the shareholder base 
in China provides insiders with more opportunities to extract private benefits at the expense of the 
minority shareholders.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first study to 
investigate the effect of the shareholder base on earnings management in China. Consistent with 
the conventional belief in western countries that a larger shareholder base helps discipline firm 
discretionary behavior, our findings suggest that an expanding shareholder base helps monitor 
earnings management in China. Second, the results expand the conclusion of Aharony et al. (2010) 
that investors in China in general are not sophisticated, allowing insiders to extract private benefits 
at the expense of minority shareholders. The findings point to the importance of investor protection 
in developing economies where corporate governance and the rule of law are not strong. This 
observation is related to the literature on investor protection and emerging market developments 
and has important practical implications. Third, the observation that investors in China fail to see 
the link between earnings management and tunneling add to the earnings management literature 
that support the view that earnings management is intended to disguise the true underlying 
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performance of the firm to enhance managers’ private benefits at the expense of investors (Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000; and Baderscher, 2011). Lastly, this study add to the literature on investor 
behavior in China and echo the view of Eun and Huang (2007) that investors in China are 
sentiment-driven. An article in Wall Street Journal (August 22, 2001) compares the stock markets 
of China to “casinos, driven by fast money flows in and out of stocks with little regard for their 
underlying value.” 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data and sample. Section 4 presents the analysis and discusses the results. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Earnings management is prevalent among business corporations (see survey paper by 
Dechow et al., 2010). Earnings are a combination of cash flows and adjustments. The adjustments 
are subject to managerial discretion and can be manipulated either upward or downward. 
According to Moeller (2000), upward adjustments of accruals are used to signal good future 
corporate performance (signaling) or to conceal past poor performance (manipulation).  
Downward adjustments are used prior to the issuance of options (Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy, 
2006) or prior to share repurchases (Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008). Research has also found that 
managers use accruals to manipulate earnings upward in order to increase their compensation 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), increase stock sales (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; and Shu and 
Chiang 2014), enhance managerial job security (Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan, 2009), 
and meet investor expectations regarding earnings forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Das, 
Shroff, and Zhang, 2009).  
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Researchers have held different views regarding the objective of firm earnings 
management. One view suggests that earnings management is made to reveal private information 
about the future prospects of a firm (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Louis and Robinson, 
2005).  A second view in the accounting choice literature argues that firms manage earnings to 
disguise the true underlying performance of the firm to enhance managers’ private benefits at the 
expense of investors (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; and Baderscher, 2011). A third explanation for 
managers’ discretionary accounting choices is contracting. According to this view, managers 
manipulate earnings to obtain better compensation contracts (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; 
and Coles et al., 2006). The third explanation, however, is likely less applicable to firms in China 
because Chinese firms are largely state-owned and executive compensation is frequently 
determined by the state. The fourth view is specific in China. Li, Selover and Stein (2011) find 
that that firms in China tend to adjust their earnings to zero to keep their financial performance 
away from the government’s scrutiny.  
Existing studies have documented significant evidence of earnings management, in the 
form of discretionary accruals manipulation, among firms in China (Wang and Yung, 2011; Chi 
et al., 2012; Qi et al., 2014). A general conclusion is that the concentrated ownership structure of 
firms in China is a driving force of firm earning management as the controlling shareholders have 
incentives to manage earnings to either satisfy short-term government objectives or extract benefits 
for private motives. Aharony et al. (2010) find that firms in China inflate earnings in the pre-IPO 
period by using related party trades and then use tunneling to extract resources from minority 
shareholders in the post-IPO period. According to Aharony et al. (2010), tunneling is an incentive 
for earnings management during the IPO process among firms in China.  
51 
 
 
Given that the conflicting implications of Merton (1987) and Rozeff (1982) regarding the 
likely effects of the shareholder base, we develop three pairs of hypotheses as follow: 
H1a: The shareholder base and firm abnormal accruals are negatively related if investor 
recognition is elevated and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is reduced 
when the shareholder base expands. 
H1b: The shareholder base and firm abnormal accruals are positively related if agency 
conflicts escalate when the shareholder base expands. 
H2a: The shareholder base and real activities manipulation are negatively related if investor 
recognition is elevated and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is reduced 
when the shareholder base expands. 
H2b: The shareholder base and real activities manipulation are positively related if agency 
conflicts escalate when the shareholder base expands. 
H3a: The shareholder base and tunneling are negatively related if investor recognition is 
elevated and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is reduced when the 
shareholder base expands. 
H3b: The shareholder base and tunneling are positively related if agency conflicts escalate 
when the shareholder base expands. 
 
3. DATA 
Our sample of 20,937 firm-year observations includes all the publicly traded non-financial 
firms in China between 1998 and 2013. The source of the data is the China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) Database, which provides yearly financial reports, equity trading and corporate 
governance information on companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
52 
 
 
Consistent with previous studies, missing values of data are filled manually using internet available 
information from http://finance.sina.com.cn/. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize the 
financial variables with extreme values at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
In Table 2.1, we provide definitions of the variables used in the study. Many of the firm-
level variables are same as those used in Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2013), Roychowdhury (2006) 
and Ma, Ma and Tian (2013).  
 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
 
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. Included are the mean, median, 
standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles. The average firm in our sample has 50,164 
shareholders of record (Shareholder Base); the median firm has 30,207 shareholders. The mean 
and median values of firm size, measured by Market Capitalization, are RMB 9.69 billion and 
RMB 2.86 billion, respectively. The mean (median) total assets is RMB 7.26 billion (1.82 billion). 
Total discretionary accruals have a mean of -52.92 million and a median of 8.8 million. Firms in 
the sample are profitable operations with a mean (median) ROA of 5.82% (4.57%) and a mean 
(median) ROE of 9.56% (7.84%).  The firms have an average 1-year buy-and-hold stock return of 
24%. On average, firm age is in excess of 10 years.  
 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
 
3.1 MEASURES OF THE SHAREHOLDER BASE 
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We use two measures of the shareholder base in this study. The first measure is the raw 
shareholder base, computed as the natural logarithmic value of the number of registered 
shareholders in order to control for the skewness in the distribution of the variable. The second 
measure is the excess shareholder base, computed using the model developed by Bodnaruk and 
Ostberg (2013). The regression equation is as follows:  
𝐿𝑛 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖  log (1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)  𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  
                                           + 𝛽3𝑖 log (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝)  𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖 log(
𝐵
𝑀
)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖 (
1
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
) 𝑖𝑡  
                                           + 𝛽6𝑖 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡   
                                           +𝛽8𝑖 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠           
                                           + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (1) 
In this estimation model, the logarithmic value of the number of shareholders (LogSH) is 
the dependent variable. The independent variables include firm age, return on equity, B/M ratio, 
market capitalization, 1/share price, stock liquidity, past year return, and volatility.  We define the 
regression residuals of equation (1) as Excess Shareholder Base (ExShBase). In the regression, we 
control for market capitalization because larger firms are likely to have more shareholders due to 
higher levels of media coverage and investor recognition. Stock liquidity controls for volume-
based liquidity. In addition, 1/share price controls for the liquidity associated with transaction costs. 
Firm age and volatility control for firm risk. Return on equity and past year return control for the 
impact of recent performance on the number of shareholders. Book-to-market ratio controls for 
the effect of stock valuation on the shareholder base.  
 
3.2 MEASURE OF DISCRETIONARY FINANCIAL REPORTING 
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Our first measure of earnings management is discretionary accruals. Following Lee and 
Masulis (2011), we define discretionary accruals as the residual term of equation (2). 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛼4∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (2) 
where total discretionary accruals (TCA) is calculated by net income before extraordinary items 
(EBXI) minus cash flow from operation (CFO) (Wang, 2006; Jo, Kim, and Park, 2007). 
Rev is total revenue, and PPE is property, plant, and equipment. All the variables are drawn from 
the CCER database and are scaled by the average of total assets between year t -1 and year t. 
 
3.3 MEASURE OF REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION 
Real activities manipulation refers to departures from normal operational practices. These 
deviations include price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to lower cost of 
goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to report improve reported margins. 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we run the following cross-sectional regressions for every 
industry and year: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝜀𝑡                   (3) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡 +  ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 
=  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡      (4)  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝜀𝑡                                       (5) 
where At is the total assets at the end of period t, St is the sales and ΔS =St –St-1. 
For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations (production costs and 
discretionary expenses) is the actual CFO (production costs and discretionary expenses) minus the 
“normal” CFO (production costs and discretionary expenses) calculated using estimated 
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coefficients from the corresponding industry-year model and the firm-year’s sales and lagged 
assets.  
 
3.4 MEASURE OF TUNNELING 
The existing literature show that firms in China suffer from significant expropriations by 
insiders (Aharony et al., 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010). Besides corporate dividend payout, a 
form of expropriation by the controlling shareholders (Lee and Xiao, 2007; Wei and Xiao, 2009; 
Cheng, Fung, and Leung, 2009; Chen, Jian and Xu, 2009; Lin, Chiou and Chen, 2010; Huang, 
Shen and Sun, 2011; Liu, Uchida and Yang, 2014), tunneling is another way to transfer resources 
away from firms to controlling shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Although Johnson et al. (2000) 
find that controlling shareholders use related party transactions to transfer assets in developed 
markets, it is believed that tunneling is even more serious in emerging markets because of the weak 
legal system (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton, 2003). 
According to existing literatures, three measurements of tunneling are commonly used: 
related party transactions (Jian and Wong, 2010; Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2006), loan 
guarantees to related parties (Berkman, Cole, and Fu, 2009), and fund occupations (Jiang et al., 
2010; Ma et al., 2013). Because of data access and effectiveness, following follow Jiang et al. 
(2010) and Ma et al. (2013), we use fund occupation by controlling shareholders as a proxy for 
tunneling, which is the ratio of the total amount of “other receivables” in the balance sheet to total 
assets.  “Other receivables” item includes receivables that are not part of ordinary business 
transactions. These receivables are interest free loans made by listed firms to other parties where 
a large proportion of these funds are occupied for a long period of time, and in many cases are 
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never paid back to the listed firms (Jiang et al., 2010). It is a widespread tunneling practice in 
China. 
 
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Table 2.3 reports univariate results comparing the characteristics of firms with a large 
shareholder base (quartile 4) and firms with a small shareholder base (quartile 1). In panel A, we 
report results based on the raw shareholder base (LogSH). As can be seen in panel A, firms with a 
higher shareholder base have lower levels of abnormal accruals. The mean difference and median 
difference of discretionary accruals between firms of quartile 1 and quartile 4 are significant at the 
one percent level. The same can be found in Panel B where the excess shareholder base is used. 
These univariate results provide some initial support of the notion that the shareholder base help 
monitor firm financial reporting behavior. 
Regarding real activities manipulation, the results in Panel A show that firms with a larger 
raw shareholder base have higher levels of discretionary expenditures (the mean difference is 
significant at one percent) and higher levels of production cost (the median difference is significant 
at one percent). The findings suggest that the shareholder base negates efforts to manipulate 
downwards production cost and discretionary expenditures. In Panel B where the excess 
shareholder base is used, firms with a large excess shareholder base also have a higher abnormal 
production cost. Thus, we have some evidence in Table 2.3 that the shareholder base has a 
controlling effect on real activities manipulation. However, in Panel B of Table 2.3, firms with a 
larger excess shareholder base have lower levels of CFO which is consistent with real activities 
management.  
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Table 2.3 also provides evidence that firms with a larger shareholder base are associated 
with higher levels of tunneling. The mean and median differences in Panel A and Panel B between 
firms in quartile 1 and firms in quartile 4 are significant at the one percent level. The univariate 
results in table 3 suggests that despite firms reduce their efforts in managing earnings given the 
presence of an expanding shareholder base, they nevertheless escalate efforts of tunneling to 
extract resources from minority shareholders. The results suggest that investors fail to see the link 
between earnings management and tunneling. 
 
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
 
4.2 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS AND SHAREHOLDER BASE 
 To analyze the impact of the shareholder base on discretionary financial reporting, we 
follow Wang’s (2006) earnings quality regression models by adding the shareholder base as the 
independent variable of interest. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  
                                            +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠   + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (6) 
where discretionary accruals is the residual of equation (2) and measured by the raw, industry 
mean-adjusted, and industry median-adjusted value, respectively. The control variables, Xit, are 
firm size (measured by log(TA), firm age (measured by Log(1+firm age)), ROA (measured by 
earnings to average assets), leverage (measured by total liabilities/total assets), sales growth rate 
(measured by change of sales divided by sales in last year), and loss dummy that has a value of 
one if net income is negative and zero otherwise . Also included is a (0,1) dummy variable that has 
a value of one if the firm is ultimately controlled by the state, and is zero otherwise. Lagged values 
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of independent variables are used in the estimation in order to control for potential endogeneity 
problems. We also control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in the model. 
In Table 2.4, regression results using equation (6) are reported. In columns (1) to (3), 
regression results based on the raw shareholder base (LogSH) are reported with dependent 
variables as raw, industry mean-adjusted, and industry median-adjusted discretionary accruals, 
respectively. In columns (4) to (6), regression results are based on the excess shareholder base. As 
can be seen in Table 2.4, the coefficient on the raw shareholder base is negative and significant at 
the one percent level in columns (1) to (3).  The results suggest that a larger shareholder base is 
associated with reduced discretionary accruals. In columns (4) to (6), the coefficient on the excess 
shareholder base is also negative and significant at the one percent level. That is, we find strong 
evidence in Table 2.4 that the lagged shareholder base negatively impacts discretionary financial 
reporting by firms in China.  
Although it is not the main focus of this paper, Table 2.4 also provides information about 
other conventional determinants of discretionary accruals. Specifically, firms with a higher 
leverage (LagLev) and firms ultimately controlled by state (State) and are associated with less 
discretionary accruals, which are consistent with Wang (2006). However, the coefficients on 
LagTA, LagGrowth and LagROA are significantly positive, indicating that large and previous 
profitable firms have greater discretionary accruals.  
 
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
 
4.3 REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION AND SHAREHOLDER BASE 
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Roychowdhury (2006) find evidence on managers manipulating real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses. Expanding the regression model of Roychowdhury (2006), we add the 
shareholder base as an independent variable. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            (7) 
where Yit is measured by abnormal CFO, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs, respectively. Excepting shareholder base, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and 
use NIdev (NI scaled by lagged TA, which is similar to ROA), MFG3 (1 for manufacturing industry 
and 0 otherwise), HASDEBT, STATE and a series RANK variables to proxy for the sources of 
cross-sectional variation in incentives for real activities manipulation. Control variables are 
expressed as deviations from the respective industry-year means in order to be consistent with the 
deviated dependent variables. Researchers have argued that firms with small annual profits (just 
right of zero) are more likely to manage their earnings to report income marginally above zero 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), therefore we define SUSPECT_NI as a (0, 1) variable that has a value of 
1 if firm-years have net income scaled by total assets that is greater or equal to zero but less than 
0.005, and 0 otherwise.  
Table 2.5 presents the results of equation (7). The coefficient on raw shareholder base is 
insignificant in column (1) where the dependent variable is abnormal CFO. The coefficient on raw 
shareholder base is positive at the one percent level in column (2) where the dependent variable is 
abnormal discretionary expenses. This observation implies that the shareholder base negates 
efforts to manipulate discretionary expenses downward. The coefficient on raw shareholder base 
is also significantly positive at the five percent level in column (3) where the dependent variable 
is abnormal production costs. The result suggests that the shareholder base totally negates 
                                                 
3 Manufacturing industries are identified on “The Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed Companies” 
which is issued by CSRC.  
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manipulations to lower the firm’s production cost. In columns (4) through (6) where the excess 
shareholder base is used as an independent variable, the coefficients are not significant. Thus the 
results in Table 2.5 provide some evidence that the shareholder base has a negating effect on real 
activities manipulation.  
As can be seen in Table 2.5, net income (NIdev) shows a consistent and statistically 
significant positive effect on real activities manipulation, indicating that firms with higher net 
income do not engage in real activities manipulation to avoid losses. Although overproduction as 
an earnings management strategy is only available to firms in manufacturing industries, production 
costs should be higher in these firms, we do not find any significantly relationship between MFG 
and real activities manipulation. The coefficient on SUSPECT_NI is significantly negative in 
column (1) but positive in column (3), showing some evidence that firms with small annual profits 
have lower abnormal operation cash flow and also negates manipulations to lower the firm’s 
production cost. The coefficients on mb_rank are positive with abnormal CFO and negative with 
abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs. This indicates that firms with 
higher growth opportunities have incentives to manipulate lower costs and expenses and increase 
abnormal CFO. Firms with higher current liabilities (cl_rank) excluding short-term debts are less 
likely to manipulate as we find that cl_rank is negatively associated with abnormal CFO but 
positively related to both abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs. 
Institutional ownership (inst_rank) monitors managers both not to avoid losses and not to engage 
in real activities manipulation, particularly if such activities hurt firm value. The results show that 
firms with higher institutional ownership have lower abnormal production cost and higher 
abnormal CFO, which is contrary to our expectation. 
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In sum, Table 2.5 only provides some weak evidence that the shareholder base mitigates 
real activities manipulation by firms in China. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
 
4.4 TUNNELING AND SHAREHOLDER BASE 
Given the weak investor protection in China, the controlling shareholders have strong 
incentives to extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders (Aharony et al. 
2010; Ma et al. 2013), tunneling behavior has frequently been detected among firms in China. We 
extend our investigation to examine the effect of the shareholder base on tunneling in China. 
𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡  
                                            +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠   + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (8) 
where Xit represents the control variables. In 2005, the Chinese government implemented a reform 
aimed at eliminating the so-called non-tradable shares typically held by the state or by politically 
connected controlling shareholders. Researchers suggest that before the reform insiders of firms 
in China had incentives to tunnel corporate resources for personal needs because they were unable 
to realize the value of their stock holdings. One of the objectives of the reform was to provide a 
proper channel for insiders to realize the value of their equity holdings in the market and thus 
mitigate the incentive to expropriate corporate resources for personal motives. Reform is a (0, 1) 
dummy variable that shows the time periods before and after institutional reform of 2005. Other 
control variables include percentage of common shares held by largest shareholders (Block) and 
managers (MgShare), firm size, return on assets (ROA), leverage, sales growth, and percentage of 
independent directors.  
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In Table 2.6, we run a set of regression on tunneling. Column (1) to (4) are results based 
on raw shareholder base and column (5) to (8) are results on excess shareholder base. With more 
control variables (column 4), raw shareholder base is positively related to tunneling. Although this 
is not consistent when independent variable is excess shareholder base in column 8, with less 
control variables (column 5 to 7), we find the positive relationship between shareholder base and 
tunneling. This implies expansion of shareholder base doesn’t arouse the attention of investors to 
the association between earnings management and tunneling.  
Reform is consistently negative with tunneling, which implies that after non-tradable share 
reform the controlling shareholders have less incentive to tunnel because they now balance their 
private benefits from tunneling with any loss from negative market reactions (Ma et al. 2013). 
Firm size is significantly negative with tunneling as large firms are subjected to more public 
scrutiny. The results also show a negative impact of both ROA and sales growth on tunneling 
because previous poor firm performance provides less opportunity to controlling shareholders to 
tunneling. Under better corporate governance, firms having more independent directors in the 
board have less incentive to tunneling. Also, STATE shows that tunneling is worse when the 
controlling shareholder is a non-state-owned firms. What’s more, tunneling problem is more 
severe in low-BLOCK firms because of the effective control of largest blockholder in China. These 
findings show that “tunneling is larger for small firms, more levered firms, less profitable firms, 
and non-state-owned firms, suggesting that the private benefits of insider tunneling are more likely 
to outweigh the costs in these firms” (Jiang et al., 2010, p2).  
Overall, our results are consistent with the view of Aharony et al. (2010) that investors in 
China fail to see the link between earnings management and tunneling. A larger shareholder base 
63 
 
 
implies higher levels of agency conflicts and firms in China are frequently expropriated to satisfy 
the private motives of insiders through tunneling.  
 
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
 
4.5 ROBUSTNESS 
4.5.1 The effect of the institutional reform of 2005 
In 2005, the Chinese government implemented a reform aimed at eliminating the so-called 
non-tradable shares typically held by the state or by politically connected controlling shareholders. 
Researchers suggest that before the reform insiders of firms in China had incentives to tunnel 
corporate resources for personal needs because they were unable to realize the value of their stock 
holdings. One of the objectives of the reform was to provide a proper channel for insiders to realize 
the value of their equity holdings in the market and thus mitigate the incentive to expropriate 
corporate resources for personal motives.  Accordingly, we expect the expropriation of outsiders 
by insiders to become less after 2005. In other words, we expect the function of the shareholder 
base to serve as a proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders to decline after the 
2005 reform. To confirm our prediction, we examine if the coefficient on the shareholder base 
changes in the post reform period.  
We report only the regression coefficient on the shareholder base for brevity sake in Table 
2.7. To examine the effect of the shareholder base on discretionary accruals, the negative 
coefficient on the raw shareholder base indeed becomes smaller in the post-reform period. For 
example, the coefficient on the raw shareholder base is -0.0119 in the post-reform period compared 
to -0.0046 in the pre-reform period. Similar results are found when industry mean-adjusted and 
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industry median-adjusted discretionary accruals are used. The results imply that after the 2005 
reform, the effect of the shareholder base as a proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and 
outsiders in China has declined. What’s more, the coefficient on the excess shareholder base is 
also significant. Thus, we have consistent results on the effect of the shareholder base on 
discretionary accruals in China in this robustness test.  
Regarding real activities manipulation, the coefficient of the shareholder base on abnormal 
CFO is significantly positive in the pre-reform period and becomes smaller after reform when 
shareholder base is measured with both raw and excess. This implies firms with larger shareholder 
base are more likely to manipulate higher cash flow in pre-reform period, but the incentive 
decreases in post-reform period. The effects of shareholder base on abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal production costs are higher in the post-reform period. Although the results 
are partially significant, they still suggest that the shareholder base totally negates manipulations 
to lower the firm’s production cost and discretionary expenses after reform. For example, the 
coefficient of excess shareholder base on abnormal production costs is significant negative in pre-
reform period but positive in post-reform period. This imply firms try to lower the production costs 
in pre-reform period but negate manipulations in post-reform period. Thus, the results on real 
activities manipulation are consistent with our prediction and suggest that the shareholder base is 
a proxy for agency conflicts in China.  
 
[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
 
4.5.2 The effect of foreign equity owners 
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Consistent with the view of Rozeff (1982), our main regression results in Tables 2.4 to 2.6 
imply that the shareholder base is a proxy for agency conflicts for firms in China and that a large 
shareholder base is not beneficial. In our second robustness test, we want to see if the presence of 
foreign equity owners could mitigate the conflict between outsiders and insiders in China. It is 
very likely foreign equity owners are more interested in maximizing the value of their investments 
than aligning their objectives with those of the state officials. Thus, the presence of foreign equity 
owners may provide a monitoring function that mitigates the expropriation by insiders. 
Accordingly, we expect the effect of the shareholder base to be less significant when foreign equity 
owners are present. 
In Panel A of Table 2.8, we report only the regression coefficient on the shareholder base 
for brevity sake. We divide the firms into two groups, those with foreign equity owners and those 
without foreign equity owners. As can be seen in Panel A, the negative effect of the raw 
shareholder base on discretionary accruals is significantly less for firms with foreign owners than 
firms without foreign owners. Similar result is found on the effect of excess shareholder base on 
raw discretionary accruals, but not consistent on adjusted discretionary accruals. The effect of 
excess shareholder base on adjusted discretionary accruals is insignificant for firms with foreign 
owners whereas the effect of the excess shareholder base on adjusted discretionary accruals is 
negative and highly significant for firms without foreign owners. In sum, the results based on the 
raw shareholder base strongly support our view that foreign equity owners’ monitoring mitigates 
the expropriation by insiders. 
Regarding real manipulation activities, only partially significant results are shown based 
on the raw shareholder base. The coefficient on abnormal production costs is 0.0132 for firms with 
foreign owners compared to 0.009 for firms without foreign owners. The results show that firms 
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with foreign equity ownership have less incentive to lower the production costs than firms without 
foreign equity ownership. 
In Panel B and C of Table 2.8, the coefficient of the raw and excess shareholder base on 
firm tunneling in China is significantly negative for firms with foreign equity owners whereas the 
coefficient is positive for firms without foreign equity owners. Consistent with previous findings, 
the result is significantly positive only for firms without foreign equity owners when the excess 
shareholder base is used in the equation. The results support our hypothesis that foreign equity 
owners have monitoring function to mitigate tunneling and without the monitoring effect of foreign 
shareholders, investors fail to see the link between tunneling and earning management. The 
percentage of independence directors of board show the similar results as the negative effect of 
independence directors on tunneling is stronger for firms with foreign equity owners. Interestingly, 
the largest shareholders in firms without foreign equity shareholders still control efficiently to 
reduce tunneling. However, when firms have foreign equity shareholders, the coefficient of block 
shareholders on tunneling becomes positive, implying the largest shareholders’ tunneling incentive 
increase. This may be caused by our measurement on tunneling. In another word, block 
shareholders of firms with foreign equity shareholders may be more likely to use other tunneling 
methods rather than other receivables to expropriate minor shareholders. 
Overall, we have very strong results on the effects of the shareholder base on firm 
discretionary accruals and tunneling behavior but weak results on the effect on firm real 
manipulation activities in Table 2.8. 
 
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
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4.5.3. The effects of institutional investors and free cash flow  
As there is ample evidence based on US data that institutional investors can monitor firm 
behavior effectively, the effect of the shareholder base may be less significant among firms with a 
high institutional ownership. On the other hand, firms with significant free cash flows are more 
likely associated with agency conflicts. Therefore, the effect of the shareholder base is likely 
elevated among firms with high levels of free cash flow. We perform additional robustness tests 
on subsamples based on free cash flow and institutional ownership.  
In Panel A of Table 2.9, we report only the regression coefficient on the shareholder base 
for brevity sake. We divide the firms into two groups, those with low institutional ownership 
(percentage of shares held by institutional owners is below the mean) and those without high 
institutional ownership (percentage of shares held by institutional owners is above the mean). As 
can be seen in Panel A, the negative effect of the raw shareholder base on discretionary accruals 
is slightly less for firms with high institutional owners than firms with low institutional ownership. 
The similar effect of excess shareholder base on discretionary accruals becomes stronger. For 
example, the coefficient of excess shareholder base on discretionary accruals is -0.0063 for firms 
with low institutional ownership but -0.0105 for firms with high institutional ownership at the one 
percent significant level. This finding supports that institutional investors can monitor firms’ 
behavior effectively. 
In panel B of Table 2.9, we compare the effect of shareholder base between firms in quartile 
1 (low) and firms in quartile 4 (high) of free cash flow. The effect of shareholder base is stronger 
for firms with high free cash flow compared with firms with low free cash flow, which suggests 
firms with higher free cash flow are more likely to do earning management. 
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In both panel A and B of Table 2.9, the shareholder base does not show any comparable 
effect on real manipulation activities among those two groups. 
In panel C and D of Table 2.9, we report the impact of shareholder base on firm tunneling 
behavior among firms with low and high institutional ownership. The effect of shareholder base 
among firms with high institutional ownership is weaker than firms with low institutional 
ownership. For example, the coefficient of excess shareholder base is 0.003 in column (3) when 
firms have below average institutional ownership, compared with 0.0015 in column (7) when have 
above average institutional ownership. This is consistent with Jiang et al. (2010), institutional 
ownership is highest among low tunneling firms, suggesting these institutions tend to avoid 
owning high tunneling firms. This also implies that institutional investors may have more 
experiences than individual investor to see the link between tunneling and earning management 
and institutional ownership do have monitoring effect on tunneling behavior.  
Regarding robustness tests of tunneling on subsamples based on free cash flow, we 
obtained mixed results and they are therefore not tabulated. 
 
[Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
 
5. SUMMARY 
Business executives popularly believe that managing the shareholder base of a firm can 
lead to significant stock market benefits for the company. Although researchers concur that the 
shareholder base is an important determinant of corporate decisions, research on the shareholder 
base has been scant.  
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This study examines the effects of the shareholder base on earnings management in China. 
Using a sample of 20,937 firm-year observations of publicly traded nonfinancial companies from 
1998 to 2013, we find that we find a negative relation between discretionary accruals and the 
shareholder base. In addition, we also find some weak evidence that the shareholder base provides 
a controlling effect on real activities manipulation. Our results also show a positive relation 
between the shareholder base and tunneling activities in China. The finding implies that despite a 
larger shareholder base provides a monitoring effect on earnings management in China, investors 
in China are still relatively inexperienced and fail to see the link between earnings management 
and tunneling. The rapid rise of the shareholder base in China provides insiders with more 
opportunities to extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Our results 
suggest that in countries where investor protection is poor, regulatory changes and improvements 
to governance practices must be made before the shareholder base can benefit the firm.   
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CONCLUSION 
Business executives popularly believe that managing the shareholder base of a firm can 
lead to significant stock market benefits for the company. Although researchers concur that the 
shareholder base is an important determinant of corporate decisions, research on the shareholder 
base has been scant.  
This thesis includes two essays to examines the effects of the shareholder base on firm 
behavior, earnings management and firm value in China. In essay 1, we find that a large 
shareholder base is associated with reduced capital expenditures, a lower standard deviation of the 
return on assets and a lower standard deviation of the return on equity. Firms with a larger 
shareholder base are associated with higher dividend payouts. In addition, the shareholder base 
has a negative impact on firm value in China. Our results are consistent with the implication that 
the shareholder base in China is a proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and outsider. When 
the shareholder base expands, agency conflicts escalate and insiders increase their expropriations 
of outsiders by directing (tunneling) firm resources for private motives.  
Essay 2 examines the effects of the shareholder base on earnings management in China. 
We find a negative relation between discretionary accruals and the shareholder base. In addition, 
we also find some weak evidence that the shareholder base provides a controlling effect on real 
activities manipulation. Our results also show a positive relation between the shareholder base and 
tunneling activities in China. The finding implies that despite a larger shareholder base provides a 
monitoring effect on earnings management in China, investors in China are still relatively 
inexperienced and fail to see the link between earnings management and tunneling. The rapid rise 
of the shareholder base in China provides insiders with more opportunities to extract private 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
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All the results suggest that in countries where investor protection is poor, regulatory 
changes and improvements to governance practices must be made before the shareholder base can 
benefit the firm. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY TABLES 
Table 1. 1: Variable definition 
Variable  Definition 
Shareholder base 
Market cap 
Book-to-market (BM) 
Leverage 
Operating income 
Cash 
Dividend payout 
Earnings 
Retained earnings 
Stock liquidity 
  
1-year stock return 
 
Volatility  
 
Capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) 
Firm age 
ROA 
ROE  
State 
Number of common shareholders of record (in 000s) 
Year-end equity market capitalization 
Ratio of book value to market value of the firm 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Ratio of operating income to total assets 
Ratio of cash holdings to total assets 
Ratio of cash dividends to sales 
Ratio of earnings to total assets 
Ratio of retained earnings to total assets 
Annual volume of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the year 
The change of closing price at the end of the year divided by the 
closing price at the end of previous year 
Stock return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns for the year 
Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of the firm 
 
Log (1+ firm age) 
Ratio of earnings to average assets  
Ratio of earnings to average equity  
A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of zero if the firm is 
ultimately controlled by state, and one otherwise 
* Data are obtained from China Center for Economic Research (CCER) data files 
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Table 1. 2: Descriptive Statistics of the sample 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Shbase(1000) 20,125 50.75 74.38 16.49 30.82 59.01 
Lnsh 20,125 10.36 0.94 9.71 10.34 10.99 
ExShBase 16,097 0.00 0.59 -0.33 0.04 0.38 
MktCap(million) 20,125 6,732 14,370 1,715 2,925 5,607 
TA(million) 20,125 5,225 11,752 994 1,871 4,078 
Sales(million) 20,125 3,630 9,035 446 1,034 2,601 
Capex/TA 20,125 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.09 
Cash/TA 20,125 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.27 
Div/Sales 20,125 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 
B/M 20,125 0.40 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.52 
Stock liquidity 20,125 2.87 3.41 0.63 1.76 3.67 
1-year return 20,125 0.22 0.75 -0.25 -0.02 0.44 
Volatility 18,594 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Firm Age 20,125 10.60 5.25 7.00 10.00 14.00 
ROE (%) 20,125 8.93 6.22 4.43 7.87 11.81 
ROA (%) 20,125 5.72 4.62 2.29 4.64 7.88 
Growth 17,615 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
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Table 1. 3: Estimation of the excess shareholder base 
  
log(Shareholder Base) Estimate St. Error t Value Pr > |t| 
C -4.2064 0.1354 -31.07 <.0001 
log(1+firm age) 0.2630 0.0118 22.31 <.0001 
ROE  -0.0079 0.0007 -11.1 <.0001 
log(mkt cap) 0.6125 0.0056 110.31 <.0001 
log(B/M) 0.4140 0.0108 38.51 <.0001 
1/Share price 4.9138 0.0875 56.16 <.0001 
Stock liquidity 0.0127 0.0020 6.39 <.0001 
Past year return 0.0630 0.0087 7.25 <.0001 
Volatility 1.7228 0.4273 4.03 <.0001 
Industry dummies Yes    
Exchange dummies Yes    
Year dummies Yes    
Adj. R2 0.5837    
N 16086    
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Table 1. 4: Persistence of raw shareholder base  
 
Quartile 4      
(largest) 3 2 
Quartile 1 
(smallest) 
Panel A. Persistence of the shareholder base for firms that are in the highest quartile of raw shareholder 
base in Year 0 
Year 0 1    
 494    
1 0.76 0.20 0.03 0.01 
 377 98 13 6 
2 0.73 0.21 0.04 0.02 
 359 106 20 9 
3 0.74 0.23 0.03 0.01 
 365 112 14 3 
4 0.76 0.19 0.03 0.01 
 375 96 17 6 
5 0.74 0.22 0.03 0.01 
 364 110 16 4 
     
Panel B. Persistence of raw shareholder base for firms that are in the lowest quartile of raw shareholder 
base in Year 0 
Year 0    1 
    814 
1 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.70 
 16 57 170 571 
2 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.57 
 41 89 221 463 
3 0.07 0.15 0.34 0.44 
 54 126 275 359 
4 0.09 0.22 0.34 0.35 
 72 177 277 288 
5 0.13 0.27 0.33 0.28 
 102 216 271 225 
 
 
83 
 
 
Table 1.4 (continued): Persistence of excess shareholder base  
 
Quartile 4 
(largest) 3 2 
Quartile 1 
(smallest) 
Panel C. Persistence of excess shareholder base for firms that are in the highest quartile of excess 
shareholder base in Year 0 
Year 0 1    
 614    
1 0.53 0.30 0.10 0.06 
 327 187 64 36 
2 0.50 0.31 0.14 0.06 
 304 189 83 38 
3 0.48 0.28 0.14 0.10 
 293 171 86 64 
4 0.48 0.25 0.15 0.13 
 294 152 90 78 
5 0.45 0.24 0.18 0.13 
 275 149 112 78 
     
Panel D. Persistence of excess shareholder base for firms that are in the lowest quartile of excess 
shareholder base in Year 0 
Year 0    1 
    1455 
1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.63 
 167 181 186 921 
2 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.27 
 300 366 402 387 
3 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.26 
 324 360 390 381 
4 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 
 347 370 362 376 
5 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.24 
 373 386 345 351 
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Table 1. 5: Univariate analysis 
Panel A: Univariate analysis comparing characteristics of firms in quartile 1 (smallest) and quartile 
4 (largest) of the raw Shareholder Base  
Variable Quartile 1 
Mean(median) 
Quartile 4 
Mean(median) 
Diff. in means 
(p-value) 
Diff. in medians 
(p-value) 
Capex/TA 0.0675 0.0615 0.0060*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0454) (<.0001) (0.0004) 
Capex ind mean-adj 0.0067 -0.0018 0.0086*** 0.0048*** 
 (-0.0089) (-0.0137) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Capex ind median-adj 0.0221 0.0134 0.0087*** 0.0054*** 
 (0.0053) (-0.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Dividends 0.0526 0.0753 -0.0227*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0451) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Dividends ind mean-adj -0.0066 0.0071 -0.0137*** -0.0028*** 
 (-0.0165) (-0.0137) (<.0001) (0.0006) 
Dividends ind median-adj 0.0118 0.0276 -0.0158*** -0.0030*** 
 (-0.0011) (0.0019) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROE 10.2474 8.4222 1.8253*** 1.6596*** 
 (8.7590) (7.0995) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROA 6.3341 4.5945 1.7396*** 1.5516*** 
 (5.1616) (3.6100) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ln(B/M) -1.3364 -0.8416 -0.4947*** -0.4865*** 
 (-1.2998) (-0.8133) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
OCF (million) 118.1427 1630.3200 -1512.1773*** -176.3343*** 
 (55.0768) (231.4111) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ln(TA) 20.9996 22.6014 -1.6018*** -1.4778*** 
 (20.9118) (22.3897) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Total Assets (million) 2080.2200 21601.4400 -19521.22*** -4085.63*** 
 (1207.5300) (5293.1600) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Cash/TA 0.2124 0.1495 0.0629*** 0.0465*** 
 (0.1734) (0.1269) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Sales growth 0.0110 0.0061 0.0049*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0056) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Leverage 42.1625 48.8428 -6.6803*** -7.7870*** 
 (42.3968) (50.1838) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Sales (million) 1693.3700 17830.6600 -16137.29*** -2033.4883*** 
 (716.2117) (2749.7000) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ln(sales) 20.4410 21.8996 -1.4586*** -1.3453*** 
 (20.3895) (21.7348) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
N 4022 4021   
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Panel B: Univariate analysis compared firm characteristics between negative and positive Excess 
Shareholder Base 
Variable 
Negative 
Mean(median) 
Positive 
Mean(median) 
Diff in means 
(p-value) 
Diff in medians 
(p-value) 
Capex/TA 0.0648 0.0602 0.0045*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0437) (<.0001) (0.0014) 
Capex ind mean-adj 0.0025 -0.0022 0.0047*** 0.0039*** 
 (-0.0116) (-0.0155) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Capex ind median-adj 0.0179 0.0132 0.0047*** 0.0019*** 
 (0.0013) (-0.0007) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Dividends 0.0630 0.0641 -0.0011 -0.0001 
 (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.6050) (0.7578) 
Div ind mean-adj -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0007 
 (-0.0152) (-0.0159) (0.9316) (0.2938) 
Div ind median-adj 0.0188 0.0195 -0.0007 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7274) (0.6129) 
ROE 9.7483 8.2930 1.4552*** 1.4575*** 
 (8.3775) (6.9200) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROA 5.6519 4.7109 0.9410*** 0.8800*** 
 (4.5400) (3.6600) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ln(B/M) -1.1128 -0.9909 -0.1219*** -0.1196*** 
 (-1.0690) (-0.9494) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
OCF(million) 782.3416 316.7672 465.5744*** -1.6437 
 (92.3496) (93.9932) (<.0001) (0.5964) 
Ln(TA) 21.6644 21.6751 -0.0106 -0.1078*** 
 (21.4516) (21.5594) (0.5633) (<.0001) 
Total Assets(million) 9752.5700 6172.7800 3579.7900*** -235.7600*** 
 (2071.6100) (2307.3700) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Cash/TA 0.1822 0.1675 0.0147*** 0.0075*** 
 (0.1476) (0.1401) (<.0001) (0.0010) 
Sales growth 0.0091 0.0070 0.0021*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0061) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Leverage 45.8920 46.7386 -0.8465*** -0.8583** 
 (46.9499) (47.8082) (0.0044) (0.0350) 
Sales(million) 8448.5600 4418.9700 4029.5900*** -24.2000 
 (1229.5100) (1253.7100) (<.0001) (0.3805) 
Ln(sales) 21.0642 21.0356 0.0287 -0.0195 
 (20.9299) (20.9494) (0.1965) (0.3805) 
N 7588 8499   
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Table 1. 6: Effect of the shareholder base on capital expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Raw capital 
expenditures 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted 
capital 
expenditures 
Industry 
median-
adjusted 
capital 
expenditures 
Raw capital 
expenditures 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted 
capital 
expenditures 
Industry 
median-
adjusted 
capital 
expenditures 
Intercept 0.0601*** -0.0130 0.0008 0.0488*** -0.0250 -0.0114 
(0.0000)  (0.1938) (0.9356) (0.0000)  (0.0101) (0.2399) 
Raw Sh base -0.0033*** -0.0034*** -0.0035***       
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)     
Excess Sh base    -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013 
    (0.2127) (0.1140) (0.1251) 
Firm age -0.0084*** -0.0073*** -0.0075*** -0.0096*** -0.0086*** -0.0088*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
B/M -0.0029*** -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0041*** -0.0026*** -0.0028*** 
(0.0057) (0.1854) (0.1374) (0.0001) (0.0082) (0.0044) 
1-year return 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 
(0.2691) (0.2767) (0.3260) (0.3189) (0.3476) (0.4025) 
Cash -0.0109** -0.0099** -0.0092** -0.0080* -0.0068 -0.0061 
(0.0140) (0.0234) (0.0343) (0.0692) (0.1125) (0.1554) 
EBITDA 0.0079*** 0.0079*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Growth rate 0.0737*** 0.0678*** 0.0691*** 0.0927*** 0.0862*** 0.0880*** 
(0.0032) (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Leverage -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Sales 0.0048*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0037*** 0.0033*** 0.0032*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
State -0.0036** -0.0037*** -0.0036*** -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0041*** 
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes No No Yes No   No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1279 0.0323 0.0325 0.1265 0.0307 0.0308 
N 13326 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1. 7: Effect of the shareholder base on the standard deviation of return on assets 
(σ[ROA(t,t+4)]) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Raw 
σ[ROA(t,t+4
)] 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)
] 
Industry 
median- 
adjusted 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)
] 
Raw 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)
] 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)
] 
Industry median-
adjusted 
σ[ROA(t,t+4)] 
Intercept 1.7972 2.1206 2.0534 1.1816 1.3703 1.2769 
(0.0208) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.1176) (0.0550) (0.0761) 
Raw Sh base -0.1799*** -0.2206*** -0.2297***    
(0.0003) (0.0000)  (0.0000)     
Excess Sh base       -0.0872 -0.1406** -0.1501** 
    (0.1405) (0.0150) (0.0100) 
Firm age 0.1666* 0.1303 0.1300 0.0965 0.0418 0.0378 
(0.0935) (0.1726) (0.1771) (0.3226) (0.6558) (0.6895) 
B/M -0.5497*** -0.5247*** -0.5227*** -0.6264*** -0.6069*** -0.6068*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
1-year return -0.0044 0.0134 0.0117 -0.0043 0.0150 0.0135 
(0.9386) (0.8109) (0.8362) (0.9401) (0.7900) (0.8118) 
Cash 0.0510 0.0053 -0.0017 0.0691 0.0283 0.0223 
(0.2867) (0.9090) (0.9704) (0.1473) (0.5394) (0.6316) 
EBITDA 0.1157*** 0.1018*** 0.1058*** 0.0917** 0.0658* 0.0681* 
(0.0051) (0.0080) (0.0063) (0.0248) (0.0818) (0.0737) 
Growth rate -1.1457 -1.9546 -1.9608 -0.3578 -1.0848 -1.0582 
(0.5186) (0.2599) (0.2622) (0.8390) (0.5292) (0.5426) 
Leverage -0.0156*** -0.0158*** -0.0164*** -0.0145*** -0.0147*** -0.0152*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Sales 0.0960*** 0.1127*** 0.1229*** 0.0344 0.0395 0.0465 
(0.0083) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.2895) (0.2020) (0.1359) 
State -0.5008*** -0.4605*** -0.4540*** -0.5182*** -0.4827*** -0.4771*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Industry 
dummies 
Yes No No Yes No   No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0419 0.0325 0.0328 0.0407 0.0403 0.0309 
N 8422 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1. 8: Effect of the shareholder base on the standard deviation of return on equity 
(σ[ROE(t,t+4)]) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Raw 
σ[ROE(t,t+4
)] 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted 
σ[ROE(t,t+4)
] 
Industry 
median- 
adjusted 
σ[ROE(t,t+4)
] 
Raw 
σ[ROE(t,t+4)
] 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted 
σ[ROE(t,t+4)
] 
Industry 
median-
adjusted 
σ[ROE(t,t+4)
] 
Intercept 1.0822 2.3315** 2.2094** 0.1266 1.3083 1.1527 
(0.3277) (0.0249) (0.0351) (0.9062) (0.1932) (0.2558) 
Raw Sh base -0.2890*** -0.3208*** -0.3260***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)     
Excess Sh base       -0.1692** -0.2574*** -0.2486*** 
    (0.0444) (0.0016) (0.0025) 
Firm age 0.1432 0.1455 0.1645 0.0300 0.0158 0.0329 
(0.3108) (0.2797) (0.2258) (0.8288) (0.9046) (0.8050) 
B/M -0.7288*** -0.6567*** -0.6684*** -0.8404*** -0.7553*** -0.7737*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
1-year return 0.0096 0.0305 0.0252 0.0113 0.0354 0.0296 
(0.9061) (0.6997) (0.7517) (0.8896) (0.6545) (0.7110) 
Cash 0.0933 0.0274 0.0321 0.1227 0.0618 0.0669 
(0.1703) (0.6743) (0.6255) (0.0703) (0.3416) (0.3079) 
EBITDA 0.0709 0.0789 0.0787 0.0318 0.0253 0.0245 
(0.2274) (0.1448) (0.1490) (0.5840) (0.6346) (0.6475) 
Growth rate -0.3412 -0.4696 -0.4155 0.9003 0.7538 0.8381 
(0.8925) (0.8476) (0.8661) (0.7192) (0.7562) (0.7322) 
Leverage 0.0250*** 0.0248*** 0.0242*** 0.0268*** 0.0264*** 0.0258*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Sales 0.1547*** 0.1188** 0.1265*** 0.0549 0.0105 0.0168 
(0.0028) (0.0138) (0.0093) (0.2344) (0.8099) (0.7017) 
State 
-0.5760*** -0.5459*** -0.5205*** -0.6032*** -0.5771*** -0.5526*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Industry 
dummies 
Yes No No Yes No   No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0433 0.0368 0.0363 0.0418 0.0354 0.0347 
N 8422 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1. 9: Effect of the shareholder base on dividend payout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
Raw dividend 
payout ratio 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted  
dividend 
payout ratio 
Industry 
median- 
adjusted 
dividend 
payout ratio  
Raw dividend 
payout ratio 
Industry 
mean-
adjusted  
dividend 
payout ratio 
Industry 
median- 
adjusted 
dividend 
payout ratio  
Intercept 0.2923*** 0.1604*** 0.2028*** 0.3493*** 0.2115*** 0.2619*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Raw 
shareholder 
base 
0.0141*** 0.0122*** 0.0141***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)     
Excess 
shareholder 
base 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0011 
(0.5623) (0.6460) (0.5893) 
Firm age -0.0046 -0.0063 -0.0039 0.0007 -0.0017 0.0014 
(0.1824)  (0.0672) (0.2505) (0.8484) (0.6206) (0.6880) 
B/M 0.0044 0.0033 0.0040 0.0110*** 0.0092*** 0.0109*** 
(0.0870) (0.1879) (0.1053) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0000)  
1-year return -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0016 
(0.6624) (0.3960) (0.4649) (0.5833) (0.3555) (0.4129) 
Cash 0.0237** 0.0259** 0.0301** 0.0098 0.0137 0.0160 
(0.0285) (0.0145) (0.0047) (0.3597) (0.1918) (0.1299) 
EBITDA 0.0260*** 0.0228*** 0.0242*** 0.0269*** 0.0240*** 0.0255*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
RE 0.0135 0.0112 0.0150 0.0148 0.0125 0.0164 
(0.2273) (0.3118) (0.1799) (0.1849) (0.2636) (0.1437) 
Leverage 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Sales -0.0129*** -0.0109*** -0.0134*** -0.0086*** -0.0074*** -0.0094*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
State -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0008 0.0001 0.0004 
(0.5946) (0.4494) (0.4543) (0.7610) (0.9812) (0.8806) 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes No No Yes No   No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0960 0.0432 0.0512 0.0910 0.0391 0.0459 
N 13326 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1. 10: Effect of the shareholder base on firm value 
 Raw shareholder base Excess shareholder base 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 1.5905*** 1.3531*** 1.4655*** 1.5363*** -0.1484 -0.1490 -0.1486 -0.1590 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.3337) (0.3318) (0.3330) (0.3018) 
Shareholder base -0.1623*** -0.1636*** -0.1678*** -0.1634*** -0.2274*** -0.2267*** -0.2317*** -0.2286*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
SH*industry-adjusted 
capex/ta 
-0.0686*    -0.6137    
(0.0864)    (0.3838)    
SH* industry-adjusted 
σ [ROA] 
 
 -0.0049***     -0.0024    
 (0.0035)     (0.7676)    
SH* industry-adjusted 
σ [ROE] 
 
   -0.0021***     0.0020  
   (0.0004)     (0.7049)  
SH*industry-adjusted 
dividend payout 
 
   -0.0573    -0.3626 
   (0.7096)    (0.4214) 
Current Earnings 
 
4.4230*** 8.6868*** 7.0493*** 4.2911*** 4.2830*** 4.2846*** 4.3057*** 4.2831*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Past changes in 
Earnings 
0.0505 0.0524 0.0515 0.0504 0.0509 0.0507 0.0502 0.0509 
(0.2669) (0.2494) (0.2574) (0.2677) (0.2635) (0.2648) (0.2695) (0.2629) 
Future changes in 
Earnings 
0.8881*** 0.8768*** 0.8520*** 0.9055*** 0.8909*** 0.8877*** 0.8929*** 0.8898*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Dividend payout ratio -0.0191 -0.0033 -0.0432 0.5896 -0.0634 -0.0608 -0.0629 0.0424 
(0.9061) (0.9835) (0.7891) (0.7221) (0.6945) (0.7064) (0.6971) (0.8375) 
Past changes in Div 
payout ratio 
0.0668 -0.0414 0.1546 0.1042 0.1142 0.0974 0.1057 0.0375 
(0.9529) (0.9708) (0.8911) (0.9265) (0.9195) (0.9314) (0.9255) (0.9736) 
Future changes in Div 
payout ratio 
-1.3304 -1.1329 -1.1885 -1.2879 -1.4557 -1.4756 -1.4704 -1.4076 
(0.3282) (0.4053) (0.3822) (0.3440) (0.2849) (0.2784) (0.2801) (0.3020) 
Current financial 
expense 
-2.9572 -3.2826 -0.4033 -3.2990 -2.3495 -2.2923 -2.3427 -2.4189 
(0.3853) (0.3342) (0.9082) (0.3320) (0.4894) (0.5000) (0.4907) (0.4769) 
Past changes in 
financial expense 
-1.5477 -1.5796 -2.0552 -1.5446 -2.0355 -2.0283 -2.0183 -2.0235 
(0.6106) (0.6031) (0.4992) (0.6113) (0.5032) (0.5047) (0.5068) (0.5057) 
Future changes in 
financial expense 
-7.9915** -8.5060*** -8.1973*** -8.9200*** -8.8887*** -8.8752*** -8.8902*** -9.0456*** 
(0.0115) (0.0064) (0.0086) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0038) 
Past changes in Assets -0.0046* -0.0047* -0.0047* -0.0046* -0.0048** -0.0048** -0.0048** -0.0048** 
(0.0587) (0.0539) (0.0550) (0.0582) (0.0483) (0.0487) (0.0499) (0.0482) 
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Table 1. 11 (Continued): Effect of the shareholder base on firm value 
 Raw shareholder base Excess shareholder base 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Future changes in 
Assets 
-0.0296 -0.0302 -0.0273 -0.0312 -0.0265 -0.0263 -0.0268 -0.0263 
(0.1646) (0.1554) (0.1999) (0.1419) (0.2117) (0.2155) (0.2075) (0.2158) 
Lagged Market Value 0.5807*** 0.5813*** 0.5800*** 0.5806*** 0.5812*** 0.5811*** 0.5811*** 0.5811*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Future changes in 
Market Value 
-0.1102*** -0.1101*** -0.1101*** -0.1102*** -0.1101*** -0.1101*** -0.1101*** -0.1101*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
State -0.0493 -0.0511 -0.0413 -0.0489 -0.0904* -0.0903* -0.0906* -0.0913* 
 (0.3728) (0.3559) (0.4555) (0.3773) (0.0989) (0.0994) (0.0982) (0.0959) 
Adj. R2 0.6047 0.6049 0.6051 0.6046 0.6046 0.6046 0.6046 0.6046 
N 10040 10040 10040 10040 10040 10040 10040 10040 
     P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1. 12:  Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base before and after the 2005 reform 
Panel A. Effects of the shareholder base on firm risk-taking behavior and dividend payout before and after the 2005 reform 
 
Before the reform (1998-2005)  After the reform (2006-2013) 
Raw shareholder base  Excess shareholder base  Raw shareholder base  Excess shareholder base 
Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t| 
Capex raw -0.0054*** (0.0002)  -0.0005 (0.7633)  -0.003*** (0.0002)  -0.001 (0.3359) 
Capex-adj-mean -0.0048*** (0.0005)  -0.0004 (0.8266)  -0.003*** (0.0001)  -0.0013 (0.1863) 
Capex-adj-median -0.0044*** (0.0015)  -0.0001 (0.9547)  -0.0033*** (0.0000)   -0.0013 (0.1826) 
stdroa(t,t+4) -0.1185** (0.0140)  -0.0452 (0.4193)  -0.2736*** (0.0063)  -0.1712 (0.1604) 
stdroa-adj-mean(t,t+4) -0.1578*** (0.0004)  -0.1128** (0.0329)  -0.3022*** (0.0019)  -0.1926 (0.1109) 
stdroa-adj-median(t,t+4) -0.1606*** (0.0004)  -0.1228** (0.0224)  -0.317*** (0.0012)  -0.2031* (0.0942) 
stdroe(t,t+4) -0.1881** (0.0127)  -0.1352 (0.1232)  -0.4392*** (0.0013)  -0.2692 (0.1044) 
stdroe-adj-mean(t,t+4) -0.243*** (0.0004)  -0.2422*** (0.0031)  -0.4147*** (0.0016)  -0.2874* (0.0787) 
stdroe-adj-median(t,t+4) -0.2329*** (0.0009)  -0.2357*** (0.0047)  -0.439*** (0.0009)  -0.2838* (0.0839) 
Div raw 0.0232*** (0.0000)   0.0074 (0.1987)  0.0099*** (0.0000)   -0.0048*** (0.0021) 
Div-adj-mean 0.0209*** (0.0000)   0.0071 (0.2107)  0.0079*** (0.0000)   -0.0043*** (0.0058) 
Div-adj-median 0.0247*** (0.0000)   0.0078 (0.1731)  0.0095*** (0.0000)   -0.0045*** (0.0037) 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B. Effect of the shareholder base on before and after the 2005 reform 
  1998-2005   2006-2013 
Ln(shareholder base) 
-0.2978*** -0.3016*** -0.3192*** -0.2996***   -0.2457*** -0.2459*** -0.2503*** -0.2459*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
SH*industry-adjusted 
capex/ta 
-0.1103***         -0.0002       
(0.0003)     (0.9931)    
SH* industry-adjusted 
Std dev of ROA 
 -0.0064***     -0.0045***   
 (0.0003)     (0.0000)   
SH* industry-adjusted 
Std dev of ROE 
  -0.0048***     -0.0045***  
  (0.0000)      (0.0000)   
SH*industry-adjusted 
dividend payout ratio 
   0.0742     -0.4558*** 
   (0.4423)     (0.0012) 
          
  1998-2005   2006-2013 
Excess shareholder base 
-0.3935*** -0.3872*** -0.3910*** -0.3945***  -0.0698** -0.0340 -0.0370 -0.0696** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0110) (0.2209) (0.1854) (0.0109) 
SH*industry-adjusted 
capex/ta 
-0.1923     -0.9366*    
(0.7138)     (0.0535)    
SH* industry-adjusted 
Std dev of ROA 
 -0.0160*     -0.0342***   
 (0.0588)     (0.0000)    
SH* industry-adjusted 
Std dev of ROE 
  -0.0030     -0.0198***  
  (0.5557)     (0.0000)   
SH*industry-adjusted 
dividend payout ratio 
   -0.2105     -1.8209*** 
   (0.5372)     (0.0000 ) 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1. 13: Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with and without foreign equity owners 
Panel A. Effects of the shareholder base on firm risk-taking behavior and dividend payout among firms with and without foreign equity 
owners 
DV 
With foreign owners  Without foreign owners 
raw  Excess  raw  excess 
 Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t| 
Capex raw -0.0021 (0.3373)  -0.0004 (0.8722)  -0.0035*** (0.0000)  -0.0009 (0.3177) 
Capex-adj-mean -0.0017 (0.3977)  -0.0013 (0.5946)  -0.0036*** (0.0000)   -0.0013 (0.1546) 
Capex-adj-median -0.002 (0.3450)  -0.0015 (0.5284)  -0.0037*** (0.0000)   -0.0012 (0.1816) 
stdroa(t,t+4) -0.0558 (0.5868)  0.1204 (0.3045)  -0.1592*** (0.0035)  -0.0776 (0.2335) 
stdroa-adj-mean(t,t+4) -0.1346 (0.1399)  -0.0189 (0.8608)  -0.2044*** (0.0001)  -0.1303** (0.0406) 
stdroa-adj-median(t,t+4) -0.1621 (0.0831)  -0.0371 (0.7375)  -0.2105*** (0.0001)  -0.1365** (0.0332) 
stdroe(t,t+4) -0.045 (0.8054)  -0.1467 (0.4822)  -0.2695*** (0.0005)  -0.1376 (0.1341) 
stdroe-adj-mean(t,t+4) -0.1634 (0.3135)  -0.2921 (0.1278)  -0.3177*** (0.0000)  -0.2375*** (0.0075) 
stdroe-adj-median(t,t+4) -0.2099 (0.2042)  -0.2999 (0.1252)  -0.318*** (0.0000)   -0.2267** (0.0114) 
Div raw 0.0003 (0.9206)  -0.0212*** (0.0000)  0.0152*** (0.0000)  0.0022 (0.3244) 
Div-adj-mean -0.0049 (0.1281)  -0.0219*** (0.0000)   0.0134*** (0.0000)   0.0024 (0.2873) 
Div-adj-median 0.0002 (0.9583)  -0.0192*** (0.0000)   0.015*** (0.0000)   0.0021 (0.3545) 
    P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B. Effect of the shareholder base on firm value among firms with and without foreign equity owners 
 With foreign owners  Without foreign owners 
Ln(shareholder base) 
-0.2970*** -0.2947*** -0.2996*** -0.3035***   -0.3333*** -0.3342*** -0.3492*** -0.3337*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
SH*industry-adjusted 
capex/ta 
-0.1049         -0.0624***       
(0.2165)     (0.0005)    
SH* industry-adjusted Std 
dev of ROA 
 -0.0081**     -0.0038***   
 (0.0233)     (0.0000)   
SH* industry-adjusted Std 
dev of ROE 
  -0.0031***     -0.0046***  
  (0.0025)     (0.0000)   
SH*industry-adjusted 
dividend payout ratio 
   -0.0597     -0.0651 
   (0.8101)     (0.3571) 
          
 With foreign owners  Without foreign owners 
Excess shareholder base 
-0.5328** -0.5209*** -0.5385*** -0.5012***  -0.2353*** -0.2226*** -0.2268*** -0.2377*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
SH*industry-adjusted 
capex/ta 
-0.9560     -0.6105*    
(0.4117)     (0.0653)    
SH* industry-adjusted Std 
dev of ROA 
 -0.0011     -0.0165***   
 (0.9470)     (0.0000)    
SH* industry-adjusted Std 
dev of ROE 
  0.0088     -0.0065***  
  (0.3531)     (0.0100)  
SH*industry-adjusted 
dividend payout ratio 
   -0.7148     -0.3687 
   (0.2958)     (0.1245) 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. 1: Variables definition 
Variable  Definition 
Shareholder base 
Market cap 
Market-to-book (MB) 
Leverage 
Operating income 
Cash 
Dividend payout 
Earnings 
Retained earnings 
Stock liquidity 
  
1-year stock return 
 
Volatility  
 
Capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) 
Firm age 
ROA 
ROE  
State 
Number of common shareholders of record (in 000s) 
Year-end equity market capitalization 
Ratio of market value to book value of the firm 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Ratio of operating income to total assets 
Ratio of cash holdings to total assets 
Ratio of cash dividends to sales 
Ratio of earnings to total assets 
Ratio of retained earnings to total assets 
Annual volume of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the year 
The change of closing price at the end of the year divided by the 
closing price at the end of previous year 
Stock return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns for the year 
Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of the firm 
 
Log (1+ firm age) 
Ratio of earnings to average assets  
Ratio of earnings to average equity  
A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm is ultimately 
controlled by state, and 0 otherwise 
Loss A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if Net Income is less 
than 0, and 0 otherwise 
Total discretionary 
accruals (TCA) 
Net income before extraordinary items (EBXI) minus cash flow 
from operation (CFO) 
COGS Cost of goods sold 
Production costs (PROD) COGS + Change in inventory 
Discretionary expenses 
(DISEXP) 
R&D + Advertising + Selling, General and Administrative expenses 
SUSPECT_NI A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if EBXI scaled by 
lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.005, and 0 otherwise 
MFG A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm belongs to 
a manufacturing industry, and 0 otherwise  
HASDEBT A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if there is long-term 
or short-term debt outstanding at the beginning of the year or at the 
end of the year, and 0 otherwise 
CL Current liabilities excluding short-term debt, scaled by total assets 
and expressed as deviation from the corresponding industry-year 
mean 
INVREC The sum of industry-year adjusted inventories and receivables as a 
percentage of total assets, and expressed as deviation from the 
corresponding industry-year mean 
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INST Percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional owners, 
expressed as deviation from the corresponding industry-year mean 
X_RANK X_RANK is a binary rank variable that has a value of 1 if X is above 
the median value for the corresponding year, and 0 otherwise. X is 
SIZE, MB, CL, INVREC and INST separately. 
Reform A (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm-year 
observation is in the period after year 2005, and 0 otherwise 
MgShares The percentage of common shares held by top executives 
Block The percentage of common shares held by the largest shareholder 
Independence Number of independent directors/total number of directors 
* Data are obtained from China Center for Economic Research (CCER) data files 
 
 
 
Table 2. 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
Shbase(1000) 20937 50.16 73.81 16.29 30.21 58.02 
ExShbase 16862 0.00 0.59 -0.33 0.04 0.38 
Da 13627 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
Ab cfo 18421 0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.00 0.05 
Ab disexp 18421 0.00 0.86 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
Ab prod 18420 0.00 0.40 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
Tunneling 20937 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Firm age 20937 10.69 5.24 7.00 10.00 14.00 
TA(mil) 20937 7263.35 51021.79 956.62 1816.24 3969.35 
MktCap(mil) 20937 9685.43 83982.36 1672.77 2862.46 5503.40 
TCA(mil) 20937 -52.92 2772.71 -61.16 8.80 85.80 
1-year return 20937 0.24 0.84 -0.25 -0.02 0.45 
Leverage 20937 44.15 19.82 29.44 44.62 59.18 
Growth 18414 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
ROA 20936 5.82 6.42 2.19 4.57 7.82 
ROE 20937 9.56 15.79 4.36 7.84 11.89 
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Table 2. 3: Univariate analysis 
Panel A: Comparing characteristics of firms in quartile 1 (smallest) and quartile 4 (largest) of the 
raw Shareholder Base 
Variable Quartile 1 
Mean(median) 
Quartile 4 
Mean(median) 
Diff. in Means 
(p-value) 
Diff. in Median   
(p-value) 
da 0.0133 -0.0038 0.0171 0.0145 
 (0.0022) (-0.0123) (<.0001) *** (<.0001) *** 
abcfo 0.0028 0.0020 0.0008 0.0017 
 (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.7358) (0.4172) 
abdisexp -0.0395 0.0428 -0.0823 -0.0003 
 (-0.0092) (-0.0089) (0.0002) *** (0.8736) 
abprod -0.0075 0.0035 -0.0111 -0.0140 
 (-0.0064) (0.0076) (0.3324) (<.0001) *** 
tunneling 0.0313 0.0350 -0.0036 -0.0040 
 (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0013) *** (<.0001) *** 
N 5235 5234   
Panel B: Comparing characteristics of firms between negative and positive Excess Shareholder 
Base 
Variable Negative 
Mean(median) 
Positive 
Mean(median) 
Diff. in Means 
(p-value) 
Diff. in Median   
(p-value) 
da 0.0060 -0.0054 0.0114 0.0099 
 (-0.0038) (-0.0137) (<.0001) *** (<.0001) *** 
abcfo 0.0009 -0.0010 0.0019 0.0041 
 (0.0009) (-0.0032) (0.2569) (0.001) *** 
abdisexp 0.0064 -0.0069 0.0133 -0.0001 
 (-0.0089) (-0.0088) (0.2929) (0.9238) 
abprod -0.0015 0.0016 -0.0031 -0.0057 
 (-0.0009) (0.0047) (0.6005) (<.0001) *** 
tunneling 0.0334 0.0359 -0.0025 -0.0043 
 (0.0116) (0.0158) (0.0021) *** (<.0001) *** 
N 12023 8914   
   P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2. 4: Regression results on discretionary accruals and shareholder base (the model 
below is based on Wang 2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discretionary 
accruals 
raw 
industry 
mean 
adjusted 
industry 
median 
adjusted 
raw 
industry 
mean 
adjusted 
industry 
median 
adjusted 
Intercept  -0.0349 -0.0476 -0.0375 -0.0175 -0.0298 -0.0185 
(0.0033) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0008) *** (0.1686) (0.0125) ** (0.1220) 
lagsh  -0.0098 -0.0096 -0.0097       
(0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) ***       
lagexsh        -0.0096 -0.0094 -0.0095 
      (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** 
lagage  -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0039 
(0.4248) (0.7889) (0.7016) (0.0023) *** (0.0192) ** (0.0102) ** 
laggrowth  0.0438 0.0361 0.0367 0.0545 0.0475 0.0489 
(0.0401) ** (0.0897) * (0.0853) * (0.0166) ** (0.0361) ** (0.0318) ** 
laglev  -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
(0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** 
lagloss  0.0209 0.0208 0.0219 0.0214 0.0217 0.0227 
(0.4639) (0.4630) (0.4427) (0.4621) (0.4545) (0.4356) 
lagroa  0.0030 0.0029 0.0028 0.0031 0.0030 0.0029 
(0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** 
lagstate  -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0033 
(0.0451) ** (0.0481) ** (0.0482) ** (0.0059) *** (0.0067) *** (0.0060) *** 
lagta  0.0065 0.0068 0.0067 0.0013 0.0017 0.0015 
 (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0000) *** (0.0171) ** (0.0016) *** (0.0037) *** 
Industry 
dummies Yes No No Yes No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1569 0.1283 0.1296 0.1510 0.1225 0.1242 
N 13617   12440   
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. 5: Cross-sectional variation in real activities manipulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ab CFO Ab disexp Ab prod Ab CFO Ab disexp Ab prod 
Intercept  -0.0017 -0.2288 -0.0801 0.0046 -0.0859 0.0283 
(0.8794) (0.0003)*** (0.0402)** (0.2341) (0.0002)*** (0.0540)* 
lagsh 0.0003 0.0150 0.0103    
(0.7724) (0.0120)** (0.0057)***    
lagexsh    -0.0023 0.0147 0.0069 
    (0.1638) (0.1381) (0.2821) 
MFG  0.0025 0.0185 -0.0091 0.0025 0.0201 -0.0116 
(0.1397) (0.0602)* (0.1396) (0.2062) (0.0864)* (0.1250) 
NIdev  0.0057 0.8723 0.0158 0.0050 0.8734 0.0163 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0014)*** 
SUSPECT_NI  -0.0148 0.0152 0.0298 -0.0166 0.0050 0.0337 
(0.0018)*** (0.5755) (0.0792)* (0.0020)*** (0.8739) (0.0994)* 
cl_rank  -0.0138 0.0500 0.0424 -0.0154 0.0512 0.0427 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
inst_rank  0.0176 0.0108 -0.0234 0.0162 0.0079 -0.0239 
(0.0000)*** (0.3102) (0.0004)*** (0.0000)*** (0.5327) (0.0036)*** 
hasdebt  0.0032 0.0211 0.0008 0.0037 0.0285 0.0012 
(0.0640)* (0.0347)** (0.8972) (0.0641)* (0.0152)** (0.8704) 
invrec_rank  -0.0245 0.0212 -0.0062 -0.0219 0.0264 -0.0102 
(0.0000)*** (0.0332)** (0.3198) (0.0000)*** (0.0272)** (0.1862) 
mb_rank  0.0095 -0.0475 -0.0247 0.0114 -0.0640 -0.0301 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** 
size_rank  0.0086 0.0627 -0.0307 0.0070 0.0696 -0.0254 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0011)*** 
state 0.0034 0.0199 -0.0109 0.0004 0.0288 -0.0104 
 (0.0721)* (0.0664)* (0.1068) (0.8670) (0.0219)** (0.2002) 
Year 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0323 0.4375 0.0080 0.0290 0.4614 0.0069 
N 18387 18387 18386 14498 14498 14498 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. 6: Impact of shareholder base on firm tunneling behavior  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.0630 0.0369 0.0302 0.1286 0.0599 0.0444 0.0272 0.1342 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
SHbase  -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0035         
 
(0.5342) (0.2377) (0.1621) (0.0000) 
*** 
        
Excess 
SHbase  
        0.0029 0.0016 0.0015 0.0010 
        (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0221) 
** 
(0.0257) 
** 
(0.1375) 
Block    -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002   -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
MgShares      -0.0001 -0.0001     -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.0174) 
** 
(0.1100)     (0.0528) 
* 
(0.0332) 
** 
Leverage     0.0004 0.0004     0.0003 0.0004 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Sales growth        -0.1038       -0.1252 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
ROA       -0.0005       -0.0005 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Firm size        -0.0066       -0.0050 
 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Independence        -0.0054       -0.0051 
      (0.0064) 
*** 
      (0.0161) 
** 
State  -0.0042 -0.0028 -0.0053 -0.0049 -0.0073 -0.0044 -0.0059 -0.0047 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0014) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Reform  -0.0377 -0.0249 -0.0234 -0.0188 -0.0335 -0.0272 -0.0261 -0.0216 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1016 0.1785 0.1961 0.1806 0.0859 0.1459 0.1601 0.1805 
N 18389 18384 18110 15246 14498 14495 14307 13879 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. 7: Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base before and after the 2005 
reform 
DV 
Before the reform (1998-2005) After the reform (2006-2013) 
raw Excess raw excess 
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Da raw -0.0046 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0048 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0119 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0115 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-mean -0.0044 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0044 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0116 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0116 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-median -0.0043 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0045 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0118 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0117 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Abnormal 
CFO 
0.0049 
(0.0018) 
*** 
0.0045 
(0.0563) 
* 
-0.0009 (0.5057) -0.005 
(0.0258) 
** 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
-0.0002 (0.8321) 0.0011 (0.3934) 0.0194 
(0.0318) 
** 
0.0258 
(0.0836) 
* 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
-0.0028 (0.1302) -0.0046 (0.1031)  0.0152 
(0.0063) 
*** 
0.0122 (0.2002) 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2. 8: Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with and without 
foreign equity owners 
Panel 2.8A: Effects of the shareholder base on discretionary accruals and real activities 
manipulation among firms with and without foreign equity owners 
DV 
With foreign owners Without foreign owners 
raw Excess raw excess 
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Da raw -0.0078 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0028 
(0.0891) 
* 
-0.0101 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0106 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-mean -0.0058 
(0.0004) 
*** 
-0.0007 (0.6434) -0.0101 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0107 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-median -0.0062 
(0.0001) 
*** 
-0.0011 (0.4702) -0.0101 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0108 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Abnormal 
CFO 
-0.0006 (0.8478) -0.0054 (0.2024) 0.0002 (0.8763) -0.0014 (0.4333) 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
-0.0140 (0.7317) 0.0735 (0.2255) 0.0203 
(0.0002) 
*** 
0.0093 (0.3001) 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
0.0130 
(0.0030) 
*** 
0.0085 (0.1811) 0.0106 
(0.0103) 
** 
0.0067 (0.3428) 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 (continued): Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with 
and without foreign equity owners 
Panel 2.8B: Impact of raw shareholder base on firm tunneling behavior among firms with and 
without foreign equity owners 
 With Foreign Shareholders Without Foreign Shareholders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.1316 0.0522 0.0333 0.1053 0.0565 0.0344 0.0281 0.1357 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0144) 
** 
(0.1216) (0.0001) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
SHbase  -0.0069 -0.0041 -0.0046 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0000 0.0041 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0186) 
** 
(0.0082) 
*** 
(0.5186) (0.3769) (0.0163) 
** 
(0.9953) (0.0000) 
*** 
Block    0.0003 0.0003 0.0003   -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 
  (0.0021) 
*** 
(0.0041) 
*** 
(0.0040) 
*** 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
MgShares      -0.0007 -0.0006     -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.4560) (0.6383)     (0.0247) 
** 
(0.1558) 
Leverage     0.0005 0.0004     0.0004 0.0004 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Sales growth        -0.2446       -0.0918 
      (0.0002) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
ROA       -0.0009       -0.0005 
      (0.0016) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Firm size  
 
      -0.0037       -0.0071 
      (0.0105) 
** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Independence        -0.0118       -0.0047 
      (0.0503) 
* 
      (0.0243) 
** 
State  -0.0031 -0.0063 -0.0084 -0.0098 -0.0044 -0.0028 -0.0052 -0.0046 
(0.4452) (0.1220) (0.0409) 
** 
(0.0099) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0016) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Reform  -0.0330 -0.0142 -0.0164 -0.0131 -0.0379 -0.0256 -0.0240 -0.0191 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0521) 
* 
(0.0241) 
** 
(0.0470) 
** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1005 0.1826 0.2102 0.2032 0.1030 0.1835 0.2000 0.1831 
N 1477 1477 1452 1276 16911 16906 16657 13969 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 (continued): Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with 
and without foreign equity owners 
Panel 2.8C: Impact of excess shareholder base on firm tunneling behavior among firms with and 
without foreign equity owners 
 With Foreign Shareholders Without Foreign Shareholders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.0539 0.0139 -0.0079 0.1027 0.0605 0.0477 0.0311 0.1402 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.1371) (0.4308) (0.0001) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Excess 
SHbase  
0.0028 0.0028 0.0019 -0.0023 0.0028 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 
(0.1965) (0.2330) (0.4142) (0.3091) (0.0002) 
*** 
(0.0382) 
** 
(0.0362) 
** 
(0.0206) 
** 
Block    0.0003 0.0003 0.0003   -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 
  (0.0047) 
*** 
(0.0073) 
*** 
(0.0062) 
*** 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
MgShares      -0.0007 0.0004     -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.8275) (0.8798)     (0.0509) 
* 
(0.0427) 
** 
Leverage     0.0005 0.0004     0.0003 0.0004 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Sales growth        -0.2208       -0.1158 
      (0.0009) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
ROA       -0.0011       -0.0005 
      (0.0009) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Firm size  
 
      -0.0042       -0.0052 
      (0.0004) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Independence        -0.0121       -0.0043 
      (0.0485) 
** 
      (0.0569) 
* 
State  -0.0074 -0.0096 -0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0071 -0.0039 -0.0054 -0.0044 
(0.0604) 
* 
(0.0185) 
** 
(0.0057) 
*** 
(0.0091) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Reform  -0.0286 -0.0170 -0.0193 -0.0135 -0.0340 -0.0283 -0.0270 -0.0225 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0135) 
** 
(0.0050) 
*** 
(0.0424) 
** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0679 0.1305 0.1542 0.2046 0.0879 0.1525 0.1658 0.1826 
N 1278 1278 1261 1231 13219 13216 13045 12647 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. 9: Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with low and 
high institutional ownership 
Panel 2.9A: Effects of the shareholder base on discretionary accruals and real activities 
manipulation among firms with low and high institutional ownership 
DV 
Low  High  
raw Excess raw excess 
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Da raw -0.0086 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0063 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0091 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0105 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-mean -0.009 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0065 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0087 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0105 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-median -0.0088 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0066 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0089 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0107 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Abnormal 
CFO 
0.0043 
(0.0105) 
** 
0.0019 (0.4892) -0.0029 
(0.0993) 
* 
-0.0067 
(0.0173) 
** 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
0.0119 
(0.0524) 
* 
-0.0073 (0.3672) 0.0039 (0.7939) 0.0296 (0.2351) 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
0.0042 (0.3027) -0.0030 (0.6504) 0.0296 
(0.0009) 
*** 
0.0386 
(0.0107) 
** 
 
Panel 2.9B: Effects of the shareholder base on discretionary accruals and real activities 
manipulation among firms with low and high free cash flow 
 DV 
Low  High  
raw Excess raw excess 
Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Da raw -0.0056 
(0.0002) 
*** 
-0.0064 
(0.0005) 
*** 
-0.0133 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.013 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-mean -0.0052 
(0.0005) 
*** 
-0.006 
(0.0012) 
*** 
-0.0129 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0132 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Da-adj-median -0.0051 
(0.0007) 
*** 
-0.0057 
(0.0023) 
*** 
-0.0131 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0135 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Abnormal CFO 0.0057 
(0.0834) 
* 
0.0159 
(0.0065) 
*** 
-0.0101 
(0.0000) 
*** 
-0.0051 (0.1082) 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
0.0232 
(0.0647) 
* 
0.0722 
(0.0015) 
*** 
0.0041 (0.6900) -0.0089 (0.5674) 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
0.0146 
(0.0471) 
** 
-0.0018 (0.8951) 0.0212 
(0.0000) 
*** 
0.0169 
(0.0149) 
** 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.9 (continued): Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with 
low and high institutional ownership 
Panel 2.9C: Impact of raw shareholder base on firm tunneling behavior among firms with low 
and high institutional ownership 
 Low  High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  0.0263 0.0211 0.0156 0.1452 0.0161 0.0100 0.0069 0.0543 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0040) 
*** 
(0.0377) 
** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0336) 
** 
(0.1501) (0.0000) 
*** 
SHbase  
 
0.0019 0.0020 0.0010 0.0060 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0023 
(0.0032) 
*** 
(0.0015) 
*** 
(0.1045) (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.5010) (0.1026) (0.8121) (0.0000) 
*** 
Block  
 
  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0032) 
*** 
MgShares      -0.0001 -0.0001     -0.0001 -0.0000 
    (0.0691) 
* 
(0.1529)     (0.0449) 
** 
(0.5341) 
Leverage     0.0003 0.0004     0.0002 0.0003 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Sales growth        -0.0907       -0.0307 
 
      (0.0003) 
*** 
      (0.0517) 
* 
ROA       -0.0006       -0.0002 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0026) 
*** 
Firm size  
 
      -0.0086       -0.0034 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Independence        -0.0032       0.0001 
      (0.2625)       (0.9690) 
State  -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0017 
(0.0182) 
** 
(0.1017) (0.0029) 
*** 
(0.0092) 
*** 
(0.0571) 
* 
(0.8406) (0.0147) 
** 
(0.0479) 
** 
Reform  -0.0200 -0.0286 -0.0267 -0.0162 -0.0007 -0.0039 -0.0042 -0.0051 
 (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.6193) (0.1435) (0.1113) (0.0778) 
* 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0388 0.1049 0.1208 0.1359 0.0006 0.0399 0.0628 0.0743 
N 8031 8030 7924 6827 6266 6262 6169 5453 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.9 (continued): Robustness tests - Effects of the shareholder base among firms with 
low and high institutional ownership 
Panel 2.9D: Impact of excess shareholder base on firm tunneling behavior among firms with low 
and high institutional ownership 
 Low  High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  0.0505 0.0458 0.0302 0.1539 0.0212 0.0186 0.0081 0.0535 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0147) 
** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Excess 
SHbase  
 
0.0054 0.0030 0.0030 0.0039 0.0020 0.0017 0.0015 0.0013 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0070) 
*** 
(0.0069) 
*** 
(0.0007) 
*** 
(0.0020) 
*** 
(0.0083) 
*** 
(0.0190) 
** 
(0.0622) 
* 
Block  
 
  -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
  (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0005) 
*** 
MgShares      -0.0001 -0.0001     -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.1822) (0.0912) 
* 
    (0.1286) (0.1967) 
Leverage     0.0003 0.0004     0.0002 0.0003 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
    (0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
Sales 
growth  
      -0.1039       -0.0738 
 
      (0.0001) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
ROA       -0.0007       -0.0001 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0038) 
*** 
Firm size  
 
      -0.0059       -0.0021 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
      (0.0000) 
*** 
Independen
ce  
      -0.0020       0.0003 
      (0.5120)       (0.8914) 
State  -0.0065 -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0030 -0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0015 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0145) 
** 
(0.0019) 
*** 
(0.0389) 
** 
(0.0005) 
*** 
(0.3133) (0.0134) 
** 
(0.0858) 
* 
Reform  -0.0199 -0.0313 -0.0297 -0.0206 -0.0015 -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0066 
 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.0000) 
*** 
(0.3725) (0.0578) 
* 
(0.0448) 
** 
(0.0317) 
** 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0374 0.0966 0.1093 0.1286 0.0038 0.0414 0.0598 0.0733 
N 6435 6435 6353 6160 5400 5397 5317 5110 
P-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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